President Trump's war on regulatory science by Lin, AC
UC Davis
UC Davis Previously Published Works
Title
PRESIDENT TRUMP'S WAR ON REGULATORY SCIENCE
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6mv663n7
Journal
HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW, 43(2)
ISSN
0147-8257
Author
Lin, Albert C
Publication Date
2019
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
1 
 
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S WAR ON REGULATORY SCIENCE 
 
Albert C. Lin* 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 The Trump Administration has taken numerous actions that appear 
hostile to scientists, scientific research, and scientific data, leading some 
observers to assert that a war on science is underway. A more precise 
characterization is that the Trump Administration is engaging in a war on 
regulatory science, as these actions take aim specifically at regulatory 
science—i.e., knowledge production and synthesis carried out by the 
Environmental Protection Agency and other government agencies in the 
course of developing government regulations. The Administrative Procedure 
Act and other laws may constrain some aspects of the war on regulatory 
science, provided that they are subject to judicial review. Internal 
administrative law and agency norms also can promote rule of law values, 
but their success depends largely on the good faith of executive branch actors 
and the willingness of Congress and the public to push back when norms of 
administrative legality are ignored. Absent such pushback, the Trump 
Administration’s war on regulatory science could lead to irrational policies 
and threaten democratic governance. 
  
                                                 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis, School of Law. Thanks to participants 
at the 2018 Sustainability Conference of American Legal Educators for helpful 
suggestions. Thanks also to Dean Kevin Johnson, Associate Dean Afra Afsharipour, former 
Associate Dean Madhavi Sunder, and the U.C. Davis School of Law for supporting this 
project, to Chris Moskal and Tessa Opalach for their research assistance, and to the editors 
at the Harvard Environmental Law Review for their feedback. 
2 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................. 3 
I. Distinguishing Research Science and Regulatory Science .................... 4 
A. Research Science ................................................................................... 5 
B. Regulatory Science ................................................................................ 6 
II. President Trump’s Alleged War on Science Within Federal Agencies
 ...................................................................................................................... 10 
A. Questioning Accepted Science ............................................................ 10 
1. EPA’s “Secret Science” Proposal .................................................... 10 
2. The Proposed “Red Team, Blue Team” Climate Debate ................. 13 
B. Devaluing and Sidelining Scientific Expertise .................................... 16 
C. Censorship of Agency Science ............................................................ 22 
D. Characterizing the Trump Administration’s Actions .......................... 26 
III. Laws Relevant to the War on Regulatory Science ........................... 28 
A. The Administrative Procedure Act...................................................... 28 
1. Judicial Review under the APA ....................................................... 28 
2. APA Challenges to Delays or Suspensions of Obama-Era Rules .... 31 
3. APA Challenges to Substantive Rules ............................................. 33 
a. EPA’s Secret Science Rule........................................................... 33 
b. BLM’s Methane Rule ................................................................... 34 
B. Statutes Governing Advisory Committees .......................................... 35 
1. Standing ............................................................................................ 36 
2. Justiciability ..................................................................................... 37 
3. Merits ............................................................................................... 38 
C. Conflict of Interest Law ...................................................................... 41 
D. Scientific Integrity Policies ................................................................. 44 
E. First Amendment and Whistleblower Protections ............................... 47 
1. First Amendment .............................................................................. 47 
2. Whistleblower Protections ............................................................... 50 
IV. Sizing Up the War on Regulatory Science......................................... 52 
A. The Limited Reach of External Administrative Law .......................... 53 
B. The Importance of Internal Administrative Law ................................. 55 
C. Eroding Agency Norms with Respect to Science ............................... 56 
1. Undermining the Role of Scientific Authority in Rulemaking ........ 57 
2. Ignoring Science as a Basis for Law and Policy .............................. 59 
D. Collateral Effects on Research Science ............................................... 62 
Conclusion................................................................................................... 64 
 
 
  
3 
 
Introduction 
Various actions of the Trump Administration have departed from 
norms of how government should operate. Regulatory agencies that rely 
heavily on science—especially the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and Department of the Interior—have engaged in some of the most notable 
departures. For example, the Department of the Interior has reassigned senior 
staff because of their previous work on climate change. Federal agencies have 
removed references to climate change from official agency pronouncements. 
And in setting pollution standards, EPA has proposed to disregard studies 
relying on confidential data even though they have undergone scientific peer 
review. Whether these actions will survive legal challenge remains to be seen. 
 Some popular accounts have declared that the Trump Administration 
is engaging in a “war on science.”1 But is a “war on science” actually 
underway? On the one hand, scientific research still receives substantial 
public and private support, and technological innovation is flourishing, 
thanks to information technology, artificial intelligence, and other scientific 
advances.2 Scientific inquiry seems healthy, suggesting that the “war on 
science” may be more a rhetorical device reflecting opposition to a 
deregulatory agenda than a fair characterization. 
However, a closer examination of science’s role in policymaking 
indicates that the “war on science” is more than mere rhetoric. In an actual 
war on science, one might expect widespread resistance to scientific inquiry, 
denials of scientific findings, and a disregard of problems identified through 
science.3 All of these features are present in the Trump Administration’s 
systematic efforts to downplay scientific activity, expertise, and scientific 
data that might support regulation. To stifle scientific activity, the 
Administration has proposed deep cuts to research funding on specific topics 
and ordered scientists not to present unfavorable results. To weaken the role 
of expertise, the Administration has skewed membership on some scientific 
advisory committees toward industry and dissolved or reduced the role of 
other committees. And to undermine the use of science in policy making, the 
Administration has questioned methodologies and truths that are widely 
accepted by the scientific community.  
                                                 
#1 @See, e.g., Editorial, President Trump’s War on Science, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2017, at 
SR10. 
#2 @See Peter Aldhous, Trump’s “War on Science” Isn’t What You Think, BUZZFEED 
NEWS, (Jan. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/2QW4-KFF9; @Albert C. Lin, Preliminary 
Injunctive Regulation, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1031-32 (2016) (discussing social 
acceleration). 
#3 @See SHAWN OTTO, THE WAR ON SCIENCE 7 (2016). 
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Efforts to manipulate or question the science underlying federal 
regulation are not unprecedented. The George W. Bush Administration, for 
example, sought to distort or suppress scientific research on climate change 
and other issues in order to achieve deregulatory goals.4 The Trump 
Administration not only has engaged in similar tactics, but also has uniquely 
rejected science as a basis for regulation to protect human health and the 
environment.5  
As this Article explains, the Trump Administration’s actions reflect a 
systematic threat to the science on which federal agencies rely to do their 
jobs. Part I distinguishes between research science—the research activities 
scientists are generally understood to engage in—from regulatory science—
the science that government agencies undertake to support regulatory 
decisions. Part II describes the Trump Administration’s actions and places 
them in three general categories: questioning accepted science, devaluing and 
sidelining scientific expertise, and censoring agency science. This part then 
asks whether an actual war on science is underway and finds that the Trump 
Administration’s actions specifically aim at regulatory science, as opposed to 
research science. Part III considers various laws that courts might apply to 
these actions, including the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, laws governing conflicts of interest, the First 
Amendment, and whistleblower protections. Congress also has the power to 
respond through legislation, committee hearings, and other forms of 
oversight, but many administration actions may remain unchecked. Part IV 
reflects on broader implications for regulatory science, including the erosion 
of agency norms with respect to science and the undermining of democratic 
governance. 
 
I. Distinguishing Research Science and Regulatory Science 
 To understand whether the Trump Administration is waging a war on 
science, it is necessary to distinguish research science from regulatory 
science. Research science refers to scientific inquiry as practiced by scientists 
in general, whereas regulatory science refers to science practiced by 
administrative agencies. Considered in light of this distinction, the Trump 
                                                 
#4 @See House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, 
110th Cong., Political Interference with Climate Change Science Under the Bush 
Administration (2007); Holly Doremus, Scientific and Political Integrity in Environmental 
Policy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1611-12 (2008); see generally CHRIS MOONEY, THE 
REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE (2005).  
#5 @See President Trump’s War on Science, supra note 1. 
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Administration’s actions appear to be directed specifically at undermining 
regulatory science.  
A. Research Science 
 Science is the pursuit of “empirically based knowledge”6 or “an effort 
to understand what is real and true in an enduring sense.”7 To obtain 
knowledge, scientists practice the scientific method, “a mode of investigation 
characterized by cycles of systematic empirical observation and hypothesis 
formation.”8 The knowledge generated through the scientific method is 
provisional, meaning that it is subject to revision in light of future data.9 
Features that distinguish a scientific theory from non-scientific ones include: 
whether the theory is based on independently verifiable empirical 
observations, whether it can generate testable predictions, and the extent to 
which it accounts for various phenomena and uncertainties.10  
 Science is sometimes framed as an objective process that generates 
definitive results.11 Scientists pursue objectivity by following specific 
conventions, such as seeking replicable results and using a 95% confidence 
interval to identify statistically significant results.12 Other norms of science 
that promote objectivity include suspending personal feelings, avoiding the 
appearance of bias, and shying away from advocacy.13 Notwithstanding 
                                                 
#6 @Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Speaking Science to Law, 26 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. 
REV. 289, 296 (2013). 
#7 @ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 137 (2009). 
#8 @Freeland, supra note 6, at 296; see also OTTO, supra note 3, at 178 (identifying 
techniques deployed by the scientific method, including “observation, inductive reasoning, 
hypothesizing, unique prediction, experimentation, recording, critical peer review, and 
replication”). 
#9 @See Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the 
Bush Administration, 32 ECOL. L.Q. 249, 303 (2005) (explaining that the scientific process 
is “continually gathering additional information and re-evaluating beliefs about the system 
in light of that new information”); @Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Law & Science: 
Toward a Unified Field, 47 CONN. L. REV. 529, 538, 540 (2014); @Shannon M. Roesler, 
Evaluating Corporate Speech About Science, 106 GEO. L.J. 447, 471 (2018) (“[T]he 
ultimate objective of scientific understanding . . . is not truth per se, but something that 
approximates truth and is always open to revision.”). 
#10 @See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 134-35; @Freeland, supra note 9, at 538; @cf. 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993) (listing factors relevant 
to determining whether a theory or technique is scientifically valid, including testability, 
whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, known or potential error 
rates, the existence of standards controlling a technique’s operation, and general acceptance 
within the relevant scientific community). 
#11 @See Freeland, supra note 9, at 537. 
#12 @See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 192 (1999). 
#13 @See Freeland, supra note 6, at 305-07. 
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adherence to such norms, some subjectivity is inevitable.14 Deciding what 
objects to study and how to study them, how to interpret data, and whether 
evidence justifies acceptance of a theory all involve a degree of subjectivity.15  
Just as science is not purely objective, neither does science yield 
completely definitive results. Results are probabilistic rather than absolute.16 
The very nature of scientific inquiry—an ongoing process whose results are 
subject to future revision—ensures uncertainty.17 Natural variation, 
inaccurate measurement, modeling limitations, and incomplete data all 
contribute to uncertainty.18 Environmental science is especially prone to 
uncertainty because the environment often involves dynamic change and 
many interacting variables.19  
 Peer review—the independent evaluation of others’ work before 
publication—is a critical feature of scientific inquiry.20 The object of peer 
review is to ensure the quality of scientific work and to certify scientific 
knowledge.21 Although peer review is not without its flaws, it is an important 
check on subjectivity and is a widely accepted mechanism for evaluating 
scientific quality.22 A scientific consensus regarding the truth of an 
observation or the validity of a theory develops as a critical mass of scientists 
comes to accept peer reviewed and published results.23 
B. Regulatory Science  
 Science intersects with law in the courts and in regulatory agencies. 
Courts use scientific facts with the goal of resolving disputes fairly and 
                                                 
#14 @See Doremus, supra note 9, at 254, 297; @Freeland, supra note 6, at 301–02; @see 
also FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 124 (explaining Thomas Kuhn’s view that objectivity 
arises out of scientific consensus, which is itself subjective). 
#15 @See FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 123; @FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 192; @Doremus, 
supra note 9, at 254. 
#16 @See Freeland, supra note 9, at 540, 545; @OTTO, supra note 3, at 234-35. 
#17 @See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (“Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual 
revision.”); @Doremus, supra note 9, at 297 (explaining that the science process is 
“designed to illuminate the extent and reliability of knowledge about studied systems and 
to increase the reliability and extent of that knowledge over the course of time”). 
#18 @See Deborah M. Brosnan, Science, Law, and the Environment: The Making of a 
Modern Discipline, 37 ENVTL. L. 987, 994, 999–1000 (2007); @Freeland, supra note 9, at 
545. 
#19 @See Eric Biber, Which Science? Whose Science? How Scientific Disciplines Can 
Shape Environmental Law, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 477 (2012). 
#20 @See Linda Greer & Rena Steinzor, Bad Science, ENVTL. F., Feb. 2002, at 28, 32. 
21 @See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 61 
(1990); @Brosnan, supra note 18, at 1002.  
#22 @See JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 69–76; @Richard Smith, Peer Review: A Flawed 
Process at the Heart of Science and Journals, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MEDICINE 178, 179 
(2006). 
#23 @See Freeland, supra note 6, at 301–02. 
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efficiently.24 Of particular interest here, agencies practice regulatory science 
by undertaking scientific inquiry and using scientific data to make policy. 
Statutes governing policymaking by agencies may explicitly demand that 
agencies employ the best available science.25 But even statutes that are less 
explicit about the role of science, such as those requiring agencies to 
demonstrate the benefits of a regulatory standard, implicitly require agencies 
to have supporting scientific data.26 In contrast to courts, which typically 
resolve disputes with finality, agencies often have an opportunity to revisit 
previously established standards in light of subsequent scientific discoveries. 
Indeed, a basic assumption of the modern administrative state is that 
agencies’ expertise enables them to address societal challenges in a more 
informed and responsive manner than legislatures or courts.27 
 Regulatory science differs from the model of inquiry applicable to 
research science. Unlike research science, regulatory science does not seek 
out truth for its own sake. Rather, the task of regulatory science is to provide, 
within a specific timeframe, the answers to questions articulated by agencies 
and framed by legal standards.28 Moreover, whereas research science focuses 
on knowledge production, regulatory science engages in knowledge synthesis 
and prediction as well as knowledge production.29 When policy matters have 
a scientific aspect, “science can play a role by providing informed opinions 
about the plausible consequences of our actions (or inactions), and by 
monitoring the effects of our choices.”30  
In synthesizing knowledge and making predictions, agencies use 
available scientific evidence to assess relationships between possible causes 
                                                 
#24 @See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 (“Law . . . must resolve disputes finally and quickly.”).  
#25 @See infra note 171. 
#26 @For example, the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to set ambient air quality standards at 
a level that protects the public health with an adequate margin of safety. @42 U.S.C. § 
7409(b)(1) (2012). The standards are to be based on air quality criteria that “shall 
accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge . . .” Id. § 7408(a)(2). Even statutes that 
authorize precautionary regulation require some scientific basis for agency action. See 
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
#27 @See generally JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 40–45. 
#28 @See JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 78; @Brosnan, supra note 18, at 994, 1002. 
#29 @See JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 77 (defining knowledge synthesis as the evaluation, 
screening, and meta-analysis of data from other studies); @see also Greer & Steinzor, 
supra note 20, at 33 (noting that in-house scientists at EPA support decision-making by 
analyzing outside studies and reassessing toxicological profiles). 
#30 @Naomi Oreskes, Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got to Do With It?, 7 
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 369, 381 (2004).  
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and effects.31 “The expert considers all available studies and determines the 
weight to be afforded to each on the basis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the individual studies.”32 The information that agencies use may incorporate 
unpublished “grey literature” which has not been subject to formal peer 
review, as well as peer-reviewed research.33 Grey literature includes 
technical reports, conference proceedings, and datasets generated for policy 
making.34  
Notably, the regulatory science that supports a particular standard 
need not meet the stringent standards of statistical significance that research 
science conventionally requires. Statutes can empower an agency to act at 
levels of uncertainty that would lead a scientist to hesitate to certify a fact.35 
Establishing a fact with a 95% level of certainty may not be necessary for an 
agency to regulate; substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence 
may suffice. For example, the Clean Air Act requires EPA to regulate new 
motor vehicle pollution “which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger 
public health or welfare.”36 Interpreting similar statutory language in Ethyl 
Corp. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit explained, “[t]he Administrator may apply his 
expertise to draw conclusions from suspected, but not completely 
substantiated, relationships between facts, from trends among facts, from 
theoretical projections from imperfect data, from probative preliminary data 
                                                 
#31 @Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Regulatory Science in Rulemaking and 
Tort: Unifying the Weight of the Evidence Approach, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 65, 78, 
91 (2013). 
#32 @Id. at 78; @see also Pasky Pascual et al., Making Method Visible: Improving the 
Quality of Science-Based Regulation, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 429, 444 (2013) 
(“The most challenging aspect of scientific inference—the challenge that lies at the 
intersection of law and science—is to determine which combination of data and methods 
best contributes to the weight of evidence supporting one inference versus other competing 
inferences.”). 
#33 @See Kirsten Engel & Jonathan Overpeck, Adaptation and the Courtroom: Judging 
Climate Science, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 19 (2013); @JASANOFF, supra note 21, 
at 77. Agencies nonetheless may adapt some elements of peer-reviewed science to the 
policy making context, such as openly evaluating opposing viewpoints and publicly 
disclosing studies relied upon. @Brosnan, supra note 18, at 997–98. 
#34 @See Engel & Overpeck, supra note 33, at 19; @Brosnan, supra note 18, at 1002.   
#35 @See Sidney A. Shapiro, "Political" Science: Regulatory Science After the Bush 
Administration, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 37 (2009) (“The lack of definitive 
scientific evidence does not mean that regulation is inappropriate. . . . Congress has 
required agencies to regulate on the basis of potential risk to humans, rather than waiting 
for definitive evidence that a substance is harmful.”); @SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 33 (2003) 
(discussing risk-based thresholds under which agencies must prove exposure to a hazard 
“that is potentially dangerous”). 
#36 @42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012). 
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not yet certifiable as ‘fact,’ and the like.”37 In other words, legal processes 
may focus on obtaining “good enough knowledge”—i.e., “knowledge that 
satisfies tests of scientific acceptability and supports reasoned decision 
making, but also assures those exposed to risk that their interests have not 
been sacrificed on the altar of an impossible scientific certainty.”38 
 The discrepancy between research science and regulatory science—
and the corresponding distinction between scientific uncertainty and legal 
uncertainty—have long served as a battleground between advocates and 
opponents of regulation. The George W. Bush Administration, for example, 
frequently used scientific uncertainty to question the need for regulation.39 
On subjects ranging from oil drilling to climate change to obesity, the Bush 
Administration invoked “sound science” as a rationale for deregulation.40 
This strategy exploited the common yet simplistic view of science as an 
objective process that “produces clean yes or no answers to questions about 
the necessity or effectiveness of regulation.”41 Such a view can foster 
unrealistic expectations regarding the science supporting regulatory 
standards. Against such expectations, the uncertainty that inevitably 
accompanies research offered an argument for blocking or delaying 
regulation.42 The “sound science” strategy also allowed fundamental 
disagreements over policy to be disguised as disputes over the scientific 
validity of data. Science does not—and should not—dictate regulatory 
policy: whether, whom, and how to regulate are policy questions that rest on 
value judgments rather than scientific facts.43 Opponents of regulation 
                                                 
#37 @Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (interpreting a Clean Air Act 
provision that authorized the regulation of gasoline additives whose emissions “will 
endanger the public health or welfare”). 
#38 @JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 250. 
#39 @See Doremus, supra note 9, 266–67. For a discussion of the Reagan administration’s 
treatment of science, @see generally MOONEY, supra note 4, at 35–48. 
#40 @Chris Mooney, Beware “Sound Science.” It’s Doublespeak for Trouble, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 29, 2004), https://perma.cc/PK2Z-H3VH; @Gore and Bush Offer Their Views on 
Science, 290 SCIENCE 266 (2000) (quoting George W. Bush as stating that “our health and 
safety regulations must be based on sound science”).  
#41 @Doremus, supra note 9, at 297; @see also id. at 255 (“Science is a politically 
appealing justification because it promises objective, rational decisions.”). 
#42 @Brosnan, supra note 18, at 1000; @see Freeland, supra note 9, at 548. 
#43 @Wagner, supra note 45, at 64-65; @FELDMAN, supra note 7, at 197 (“[S]cience itself 
lacks the capacity to answer the questions that law must address.”). Indeed, agencies often 
face a slew of “science policy” questions—such as how data should be interpreted—that 
raise both scientific and policy considerations. @See Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive 
and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: 
Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 732–47 (1979).  
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nevertheless sought to sidestep these policy questions by asserting an absence 
of sound science. 
II. President Trump’s Alleged War on Science Within Federal Agencies 
 This Part explores elements of the Trump Administration’s alleged 
war on science, including its proposed rule targeting “secret science” at EPA, 
its replacement of academic experts on scientific advisory boards with 
industry representatives, its personnel actions involving agency scientists, 
and its elimination of references to climate change on agency websites and in 
official pronouncements. These actions can be placed into three general 
categories: questioning accepted science, devaluing scientific expertise, and 
censoring agency science. Rather than reflecting an all-out war on science, 
these actions constitute a pervasive effort to undermine regulatory science.  
A. Questioning Accepted Science 
 Scientific inquiry is an ongoing process for “deepening our 
understanding of the natural world.”44 Through the application of empirical, 
“value-neutral tools,” science generates knowledge that serves as a critical 
input to environmental policymaking.45 This knowledge may demonstrate the 
existence of serious threats to human health and the environment. And if this 
knowledge is widely accepted, public and political pressure may build for 
government to respond to such threats. In the face of accepted scientific 
knowledge, the Trump administration has isolated certain characteristics of 
the scientific process—transparency and skepticism—and sought to 
delegitimize scientific findings that the Administration asserts do not fully 
exhibit these characteristics.  
1. EPA’s “Secret Science” Proposal 
A leading example of this approach is the Administration’s proposal 
to prohibit EPA from issuing rules based on studies that use confidential 
data.46 Touted as a measure to promote transparency and counter “secret 
science,” the proposal requires EPA to “clearly identify all studies (or other 
regulatory science) relied upon when it takes any final agency action” and to 
                                                 
#44 @Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource 
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 560 (2007). 
#45 @Id. at 560; @see Wendy Wagner, The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate 
over the Role of Science in Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 63, 64 (2003); @Biber, supra note 19, at 476. 
#46 @See Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. 18,768 (Apr. 
30, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30). Despite delays in the expected completion 
date for the rule, EPA Administrator Andrew Wheeler has expressed his desire to finalize 
the rule in 2019. @See Timothy Cama, EPA to Pursue Final “Science Transparency” Rule 
in 2019, THE HILL (Dec. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/2YFL-9EBU. 
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“ensure that dose response data and models underlying pivotal regulatory 
science are publicly available in a manner sufficient for independent 
validation.”47 Apparently developed without input from the scientific 
community, EPA’s proposal resembles proposals advocated by industry 
groups and conservative think tanks and is patterned after proposed 
legislation previously sponsored by former Representative Lamar Smith (R-
Tex.), an avowed opponent of climate science.48  
On its face, the proposed rule’s precise effect is uncertain, as it 
contains somewhat vague provisions and authorizes the EPA administrator to 
make case-by-case exemptions.49 The proposal might have little impact on 
short-term industry studies that tend to suggest exposure to a substance 
causes little or no harm.50 However, the proposal would likely exclude—and 
appears to be aimed at—influential long-term studies that use private health 
data to link air pollution with serious health effects.51 Excluding such studies 
presumably would result in the issuance of weaker health and environmental 
standards.52  
Transparency in agencies’ use of science can enhance accountability 
by allowing the public to evaluate the scientific and policy judgments 
contributing to agency decisions.53 In general, agencies should “identify[] the 
                                                 
#47 @Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. at 18,773 (emphasis 
in original).  
#48 @See Maxine Joselow, Emails: EPA All Ears as Industry Pitched “Secret Science,” 
GREENWIRE (May 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/KVA4-VFH9; @Scott Waldman & Niina 
Heikkinen, Smith Pitched Pruitt on “Secret Science.” Now It’s Happening, CLIMATEWIRE 
(Apr. 20, 2018), https://perma.cc/2JT7-X7L8; @Scott Waldman, Science Reform Eyed as 
Path to Unravel Endangerment Finding, CLIMATEWIRE (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/DQS8-JN5P; @Letter from Michael Honeycutt, Chair of Science 
Advisory Board, to E. Scott Pruitt, Science Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of EPA 
Proposed Rule: Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science (June 28, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/WK2P-Q4BB.  
#49 @See Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, 83 Fed. Reg. at 18,772–74.  
#50 @See Waldman, supra note 48 (noting that proposal would exclude long-term historical 
studies while allowing industry to “provide the studies they've done that show the effects 
are minimal or less”).  
#51 @See Scott Waldman, Here Are 3 Studies that Might Be Hit by Pruitt’s Rule, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Apr. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/TK74-N8AL; @Robinson Meyer, Scott 
Pruitt’s New Rule Could Completely Transform the EPA, ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/2JNC-7TGS. The “Six Cities” study, a long-term Harvard School of 
Public Health study that has served as the basis for tightened air pollution standards, would 
likely be excluded under the proposed rule and has been the target of deregulatory groups 
since the late 1990s. @See Waldman, supra; @Wagner, supra note 45, at 79; @NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACCESS TO RESEARCH DATA IN THE 21ST CENTURY vii–viii (2002). 
#52 @See Waldman, supra note 51; @Meyer, supra note 51. 
#53 @See WENDY WAGNER, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY 
DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 14 (2013). 
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overarching values and assumptions that influenced the technical decision-
making[,] . . .  detail[] the literature consulted[, and] explain[] how or why  
they weighted or excluded” various studies.54   
However, EPA’s proposal incorrectly assumes that data transparency 
is a necessary condition of scientific validity.55 Objecting to the proposal, the 
editors of four major scientific journals explained that “in not every case can 
all data be shared,” and “[i]t does not strengthen policies based on scientific 
evidence to limit the scientific evidence that can inform them.”56 The 
hallmark of the scientific process is peer review, rather than data transparency 
per se.57 Prior to the Trump Administration, agencies were encouraged to 
disclose underlying data “to the extent practicable and permitted by law.”58 
This limitation reflects the importance of safeguarding personal privacy, 
trade secrets, and confidential business information.59 Until now, however, 
agencies have not been precluded from relying on studies that incorporate 
confidential data. This long-standing approach—which federal agencies 
other than EPA continue to follow—is consistent with accepted scientific 
practice and ethical standards, which guarantee data privacy to human 
subjects through confidentiality agreements and the like.60 Indeed, the 
scientific community is able to judge the merits of studies that rely on 
confidential data: “as a core skill, scientists are trained in assessing research 
publications by judging the articulation and logic of the research design, the 
                                                 
#54 @See WENDY WAGNER, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY 
DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 25 (2013).  
#55 @See Waldman & Heikkinen, supra note 48; @see also David Michaels & Thomas 
Burke, The Dishonest HONEST Act, 356 SCIENCE 989 (2017) (criticizing similar legislative 
proposal as “an attempt by politicians to override scientific judgment and dictate narrow 
standards by which science is deemed valuable for policy”); @Wendy Wagner et al., 
Whose Science? A New Era in Regulatory “Science Wars,” 362 SCIENCE 636 (2018) 
(suggesting that the EPA proposal adopts as a legal requirement a particularized notion of 
transparency, even though the concept is in flux and subject to interpretation within the 
scientific community). 
#56 @See Jeremy Berg et al., Joint Statement on EPA Proposed Rule and Public 
Availability of Data, SCIENCE (Apr. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/X2SB-EBHH; @see also 
Robinson Meyer, Even Geologists Hate the EPA’s New Science Rule, ATLANTIC (July 17, 
2018), https://perma.cc/9T3B-LMGN. 
#57 @See Berg et al., supra note 56. 
#58 @Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 41,358 & n.12 (July 10, 2013).  
#59 See id. 
#60 @See Waldman, supra note 51; @see also Berg et al., supra note 57 (noting 
importance of data sharing while recognizing that data sets featuring personal identifiers 
“cannot be shared openly with all”). 
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clarity of the description of the methods used for data collection and analysis, 
and appropriate citation of previous results.”61  
2. The Proposed “Red Team, Blue Team” Climate Debate 
In another example of questioning accepted science, former EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt repeatedly advocated a “red-team, blue-team” 
exercise as a means of challenging the scientific consensus on climate 
change.62 Such an exercise would have misframed a policy debate over 
responding to climate change as a scientific debate over climate change’s 
existence.63  
Developed by the U.S. military to test assumptions associated with a 
particular action or set of circumstances, the “red-team, blue-team” technique 
is a tool for analyzing policy options, not for determining scientific truths.64 
The red team’s task is to challenge a strategy or preconceived notions by 
“fram[ing] a problem from the perspective of an adversary or sceptic. . . .”65 
Vulnerabilities and uncertainties are identified through a back-and-forth 
debate between red and blue team analysts.66  
Unlike the scientific method, the red-team, blue-team approach is 
“not designed to take a testable hypothesis and then look at whether 
                                                 
#61 @Berg et al., supra note 57. 
#62 @See Emily Holden, Pruitt Will Launch Program to “Critique” Climate Science, 
CLIMATEWIRE, EE NEWS (June 30, 2017), https://perma.cc/28Z5-M833. While Pruitt’s 
successor, Administrator Andrew Wheeler, has disavowed plans to pursue a “red-team, 
blue-team” debate, the matter is not completely settled. @See Robin Bravender & Kevin 
Bogardus, Transcript of E&E News’ Interview with Andrew Wheeler, E&E NEWS PM (July 
13, 2018), https://perma.cc/227H-UN2M. In the context of a rulemaking for new power 
plants, EPA recently asked for comments on whether it must make a new finding that 
GHGs endanger public health—the very finding that was the target of the proposed 
exercise. @EPA, Review of Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,424, 65,432 n.25 (Dec. 20, 2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60); @see also Emily Holden, Scott Pruitt Never Gave Up EPA Plans to Debate Climate 
Science, Records Show, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/3G9U-H796 
(reporting that EPA and the White House reached a compromise to ask for public 
comments on the endangerment finding rather than hold a public debate on climate 
change). 
#63 Appeals to scientific authority are sometimes made to avoid accountability for policy 
decisions. @See Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995).  
#64 @See Holden, supra note 62; Steven Koonin, A “Red Team” Exercise Would 
Strengthen Climate Science, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/XR5C-HRGC.  
#65 @Red Team, FINANCIAL TIMES LEXICON, https://perma.cc/GJX5-JKEL. 
#66 @See Koonin, supra note 64. 
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observations and theory support or refute it.”67 Accordingly, the technique is 
not suited to assess whether the evidence demonstrates the existence of 
particular risks—for example, in the case of climate change, to determine 
whether climate change is occurring. Rather, the red-team, blue-team 
approach is designed to assist policymakers in deciding how to respond to 
particular risks —i.e., problems of risk management.68 The technique can be 
used to map possible future scenarios, find gaps in plans, and develop 
alternative strategies.69 As such, the “red-team, blue-team” technique differs 
substantially from scientific peer review, a process in which qualified experts 
review a work to provide feedback and assure that it meets scientific 
standards.70 Unlike the “red-team, blue-team” approach, which is 
deliberately adversarial,71 peer review is intended to be independent and 
objective, but not necessarily adversarial. 
As contemplated by Pruitt, a red-team, blue-team debate on climate 
change would have proceeded through a series of exchanges between a “red 
team” of scientists tasked with critiquing the published science on climate 
change and a “blue team” charged with rebutting the red team critique.72 
Public and televised, this back-and-forth process could have served as a 
stepping stone for reversing EPA’s 2009 finding that greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions endanger public health or welfare.73 Such a reversal could lead to 
the unwinding of federal regulation of GHG emissions under the Clean Air 
Act.74  
                                                 
#67 @Richard B. Rood, Red Team-Blue Team? Debating Climate Science Should Not Be a 
Cage Match, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/47XN-5SKT. 
#68 @See DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF DOD RED 
TEAMING ACTIVITIES 2 (2003) (stating that purpose of red teams “is to reduce an 
enterprise’s risks and increase its opportunities”).  
#69 @See Financial Times Lexicon, supra note 65; @Defense Science Board Task Force, 
supra note 68, at 4. 
#70 @See Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: What Would Be the Point of Pruitt’s “Red 
Team-Blue Team” Climate Exercise?, WASH. POST (July 3, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/HK4M-WYNH; @see also Kelly Levin, Pruitt’s “Red Team-Blue Team” 
Exercise a Bad Fit for EPA Climate Science, World Resources Institute (June 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/P5WL-ZEVL. 
#71 @See Defense Science Board Task Force, supra note 68, at 4–5 (noting that red teams 
may serve as “surrogate adversaries” or as “devil’s advocates”).  
#72 @See Koonin, supra note 64; @Scott Waldman, Pruitt “Guaranteeing” Debate on 
Climate Science Soon, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/5RU5-YDEK. 
#73 @See Holden, supra note 62; @Valerie Volcovici, EPA Chief Wants Scientists to 
Debate Climate on TV, REUTERS (July 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/3G6E-GLAU; @EPA, 
Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496, 66523 (Dec. 15, 2009). 
#74 @See Bob Sussman, Back to Basics or Slash and Burn? Scott Pruitt’s Reign as EPA 
Administrator, 47 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10917, 10923 (2017); @see also Utility Air Resources 
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Leading scientific organizations worried that a red-team, blue-team 
exercise on climate change would allow the “use [of] policy disagreements 
as a pretext to challenge scientific conclusions,”75 offer a prominent platform 
to climate change deniers, and cultivate skepticism regarding factual matters 
on which the scientific community has reached a consensus.76 Indeed, the 
debate contemplated by Pruitt would not have been a neutral exercise aimed 
at discovering scientific truth.77 Potential participants included scientists who 
lack expertise in climatology or any field relating to climate change, as well 
as non-scientists who staunchly oppose vigorous climate policies.78 In 
addition, a televised debate format would have readily lent itself to 
magnifying dissension and conflict.79 
A red-team, blue-team debate would have complemented other efforts 
by the Trump Administration to foster public doubt on climate change.80 
President Trump once described climate change as a “hoax” and has 
continued to dismiss scientific evidence of climate change since taking 
office.81 In confirmation hearings and public pronouncements, numerous 
                                                 
Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436–37 (2014) (discussing endangerment finding and 
subsequent EPA actions to regulate GHG emissions). A reversal of the 2009 endangerment 
finding would face an uphill struggle to survive judicial review. @See Sussman, supra, at 
10,923. 
#75 @Letter to Scott Pruitt from Rush Holt (CEO, American Association for the 
Advancement of Science) et al., (July 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/P54L-EGGW. 
#76 @See Levin, supra note 70. 
#77 @See Grandoni, supra note 70; @see also Roesler, supra note 9, at 498 (describing 
danger that a statement highlighting uncertainty regarding climate change can be 
misleading “precisely because it capitalizes on the cognitive biases and cultural 
predispositions of some people”). 
#78 @See Scott Waldman, Picking “Red-Team” Roster Presents Minefield for Pruitt, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Oct. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/WNG5-2PAE. 
#79 @See Jaeho Cho & Yerheen Ha, On the Communicative Underpinnings of Campaign 
Effects: Presidential Debates, Citizen Communication, and Polarization in Evaluations of 
Candidates, 29 POLITICAL COMMUNICATION 184, 184–85 (2012) (noting studies 
concluding that viewing of presidential debates reinforces viewers’ partisan preferences); 
@Benjamin R. Warner & Mitchell S. McKinney, To Unite and Divide: The Polarizing 
Effect of Presidential Debates, 64 COMMUNICATION STUDIES 508, 522 (2013) (finding that 
viewing presidential debates increases polarization, especially among those who were least 
polarized before viewing debates). 
#80 @See Matt Viser, “Just a Lot of Alarmism”: Trump’s Skepticism of Climate Science Is 
Echoed Across GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/NLP8-FTDH. 
#81 @See Josh Dawsey et al., Trump on Climate Change: “People Like Myself, We Have 
Very High Levels of Intelligence But We’re Not Necessarily Such Believers,” WASH. POST 
(Nov. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/M7BT-GHJ4; @Michael Biesecker et al., Trump Wages 
Battle Against Regulations, Not Climate Change, PBS NEWS HOUR (June 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/MS5W-YYP6; @Grace Guarnieri, Trump Questions Climate Change in 
Piers Morgan Interview, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/4SHV-35G2. 
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cabinet members have asserted that the science on climate change is 
unclear.82 More recently, the Trump Administration announced a National 
Security Council initiative under which a group of federal scientists would 
reassess government analyses of climate science.83   Even the mere prospect 
of a red-team, blue-team debate could sow further doubts among the public 
about the validity of climate science by suggesting that the matter is 
unresolved.84  
B. Devaluing and Sidelining Scientific Expertise 
A second category in the alleged war on science consists of actions 
aimed at diminishing the role of scientific experts in government. Individual 
appointment decisions as well as broader changes in the composition and use 
of scientific advisory committees have devalued expert contributions to 
policy. 
 President Trump took more than 19 months to appoint a presidential 
science advisor, more than double the length of time any president went 
without such an advisor since the position was first established under 
President Eisenhower.85 Such an advisor could assist the president in sorting 
                                                 
#82 @See, e.g., Hearing on Nomination of Attorney General Scott Pruitt to be 
Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 28 (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/MCA5-JJ7M (stating that “[t]he ability to measure with precision the 
degree and extent of [climate change] impact[s] . . . are subject to continuing debate and 
dialogue”); @Hearing on Nomination of Kirstjen M. Nielsen to be Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security 34 (Nov. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/QU55-FK3M 
(responding to question whether climate change is primarily caused by humans, “I believe 
that climate change exists. I am not prepared to determine causation”); @see also Scott 
Waldman, Here’s How Science Fared in the First Year of Trump, CLIMATEWIRE (Dec. 20, 
2017), https://perma.cc/AH5C-7Z5Q; @Emily Holden & Niina Heikkinen, Top Officials 
Harden Against Climate Science Since Confirmation, CLIMATEWIRE (July 25, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/PPV4-698Q. At his confirmation hearing, Administrator Pruitt questioned 
the degree of human influence on the climate and the extent of climate impacts. @See Scott 
Waldman & Niina Heikkinen, Pruitt Suggests Warming Can Help Humans, CLIMATEWIRE 
(Feb. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/L7WU-TTN8. 
#83 @Juliet Eilperin et al., White House To Set Up Panel to Counter Climate Change 
Consensus, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/49Y7-FR6S. 
#84 @See Scott Waldman, Climate Critics See New Paths to “Alternative” Science, 
CLIMATEWIRE (July 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/96FM-XR5X (discussing red team 
approach as one of several options for “creating doubt in the public mind around climate 
change”). 
85 @See Sara Reardon & Alexandra Witze, Trump Finally Nominates a Science Adviser, 
560 NATURE 150, 150 (2018); @Mythili Sampathkumar, Donald Trump Has Not Had a 
Science Advisor for Longer Than Any Other President, INDEPENDENT (July 27, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/H6CK-NM4Y; @Christa Marshall, Trump Plans Shakeup of Science 
Council, GREENWIRE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z6V7-5CZH. The nominee, Kelvin 
Droegemeier, was confirmed on January 2, 2019, more than 23 months after Trump took 
office. @See Lauren Morello, Donald Trump Finally Has a White House Science Adviser, 
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through different perspectives on federal disaster response, North Korea’s 
nuclear program, and other policy matters that raise scientific issues.86 The 
President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, an advisory 
group of private sector experts that has provided reports on scientific and 
technological developments to the president since 1990, has remained 
unpopulated and unstaffed.87 And EPA has announced plans to dissolve its 
Office of the Science Advisor, which provides scientific advice directly to 
the EPA administrator.88  
Furthermore, the Administration has nominated or appointed non-
scientists to positions that require scientific expertise or have traditionally 
been held by scientists. Examples include: Sam Clovis, a former economics 
professor and talk radio host with no science background, nominated to a 
Department of Agriculture position that by statute must be filled by a 
“distinguished scientist[] with specialized training or significant experience 
in agricultural research, education, and economics”;89 Barry Myers, CEO of 
                                                 
NATURE: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENCE (Jan. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/VA8D-
TPV3. By comparison, President George W. Bush’s science adviser was confirmed nine 
months after Bush took office, and President Clinton’s science adviser was confirmed just 
days after Clinton took office. @See Daniel Southerl, Gibbons Confirmed as President’s 
Science Adviser, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 1993), https://perma.cc/5JPJ-TD55 (reporting 
confirmation of John Gibbons as Clinton’s presidential science advisor); MOONEY, supra 
note 4, at 240 (noting that Bush’s science adviser was confirmed in late October 2001) For 
a historical account of how the presidential science advisor position was established, @see 
Roger Pielke Jr. & Roberta Klein, The Rise and Fall of the Science Advisor to the President 
of the United States, 47 MINERVA 7 (2009). [AU: We still have not been able to locate 
the source that says the position was first established by President Eisenhower. Please 
consider adding a source that explicitly supports that claim][AL: How about this: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/10/when-a-president-banishes-
science-from-the-white-house/505937/-- the article notes that Eisenhower named the 
first full-time presidential science advisor; maybe change text to “ . . . since a full-time 
advisor was first named by President Eisenhower.”]] 
#86 @See Scott Waldman, Will Trump Name a Scientist? A Poli-Sci Grad Runs the Show, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/9JH9-EMHQ. 
#87 @See Kenneth M. Evans & Kirstin R.W. Matthews, Science Advice to the President 
and the Role of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 15 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/SPE2-NUEV (noting that Trump had not named any individuals to the 
Council as of July 2018). Predecessors to the PCAST in providing scientific advice to the 
president date back to the 1930s. @See Rod Kuckro & Christa Marshall, Top Advisory 
Groups Dormant at DOE, White House, ENERGYWIRE (May 11, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/C3UP-ZBNQ.  
#88 @See Coral Davenport, EPA to Eliminate Office That Gives Scientific Input, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2018, at A13. 
#89 @See Marc Heller, After Clovis, Groups Debate Need for Scientists in USDA Post, 
GREENWIRE (Dec. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/X5L3-D2RH. Clovis withdrew from 
consideration prior to a confirmation vote. Id. 
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AccuWeather, nominated to lead the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration;90 Jim Bridenstine, a former congressman and Navy aviator, 
appointed as the first politician to lead NASA;91 and Aurelia Skipwith, a 
former molecular geneticist and manager at Monsanto, nominated as U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service director, who by statute must “by reason of 
scientific education and experience, [be] knowledgeable in the principles of 
fisheries and wildlife management.”92  
Appointments of agency officials are not the only way in which the 
Trump Administration has reduced the role of scientific expertise. An even 
more pervasive effort has involved changes in the staffing and operation of 
scientific advisory committees. EPA relies heavily on 22 scientific advisory 
committees to inform its work.93 Input from these committees not only 
informs the agency’s actions but also helps to persuade courts to defer to 
those actions.94 Among the most prominent of EPA’s advisory committees 
are its Science Advisory Board (SAB), Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee (CASAC), and Board of Scientific Counselors (BOSC). The 
SAB, established to provide scientific advice to EPA or to Congress upon 
request, reviews whether the scientific and technical basis of proposed 
regulations is adequate.95 By statute, the SAB must be “composed of at least 
nine members . . . qualified by education, training, and experience to evaluate 
scientific and technical information on matters referred to the Board.”96 The 
                                                 
#90 @See Rob Hotakainen, Trump Picks CEO to Lead NOAA, Lockheed Exec for Defense, 
E&E DAILY (Oct. 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/H5MT-RJFN. 
#91 @See Scott Waldman, Trump’s Pick for NASA Chief Hits a Senate Roadblock, 
CLIMATEWIRE (Jan. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/YZV3-HCW4. 
#92 @Emily Holden, Trump to Nominate Former Monsanto Executive to Top Interior 
Department Position, GUARDIAN, Oct. 23, 2018, https://perma.cc/3S54-ZDML; @16 
U.S.C. § 742b(b) (2012). 
#93 @See All Advisory Committees at EPA, (Feb. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/8VEJ-G7R3.  
#94 @See, e.g., Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1344–45 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding 
EPA’s setting of ambient pollution standard based in part on unanimous recommendation 
by Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee); @NRDC v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 573–76 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (finding that EPA failed to adequately consider ballast water treatment options 
where letter from members of science advisory committees indicated that agency had 
prevented development of relevant information); @see also Pascual et al., supra note 32, at 
457 (“courts seem to defer more heavily to agency outputs that have been reviewed and 
endorsed by science advisory panels”). 
#95 @See 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2012); @see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-15-500, EPA’S SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD: IMPROVED PROCEDURES NEEDED TO 
PROCESS CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS FOR SCIENTIFIC ADVICE 4 (2015), 
https://perma.cc/7U3N-LCTC. 
#96 @42 U.S.C. § 4365(b) (2012). The SAB is currently composed of approximately 45 
members. @2017 SAB Renewal Membership Balance Plan (Aug. 15, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7NY3-PXBU. 
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CASAC advises EPA on setting and revising ambient air quality standards 
and on research regarding the adequacy of such standards.97 The CASAC’s 
seven members must include “at least one member of the National Academy 
of Sciences, one physician, and one person representing State air pollution 
control agencies.”98 Finally, the BOSC advises EPA on the technical and 
management aspects of its research programs.99 Created under the agency’s 
discretionary authority,100 the BOSC is composed of twenty members 
selected “from the environmental scientific and technical fields, human 
health care professions, academia, industry, public and private research 
institutes and organizations, and other relevant interest areas.”101  
 Under the Trump Administration, EPA has taken several steps to alter 
the composition of these committees or reduce their influence. In June 2017, 
EPA announced that it would not renew BOSC members with expiring 
appointments—contrary to past practice—and cancelled upcoming meetings 
of the board’s subcommittees.102  EPA similarly departed from longstanding 
precedent in declining to renew members of its SAB.103 Such steps, initiated 
by then-Administrator Pruitt, have continued under Administrator Wheeler, 
who has displaced academic researchers on the CASAC and eliminated 
advisory panels charged with reviewing the agency’s standards for ozone and 
particulate matter—two of the most significant air pollutants the agency 
regulates.104 Though not legally required to do so, EPA had relied on such 
advisory panels to provide specialized expert advice since at least the late 
1970s.105   
                                                 
#97 @See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2012); @U.S. Government Accountability Office, supra 
note 95, at 1, 5. 
#98 @42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
#99 @See BOSC Renewal Charter (May 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/E9DE-PUDL. 
#100 @Memorandum from E. Scott Pruitt, EPA Adm’r to Assistant Adm’rs et al. on 
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2017), https://perma.cc/U8DT-2P72. 
#101 @BOSC Renewal Charter, supra note 99, at 3. 
#102 @See Sean Reilly, 38 Science Advisers Get Pink Slips—Internal Email, GREENWIRE, 
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Science Panel: “Your Service . . . Has Concluded,” GREENWIRE, Oct, 12, 2018, 
https://perma.cc/3UNF-LRPG. 
#105 @See Letter from H. Christopher Frey et al., former members of 2015-18 CASAC 
Particular Matter Review Panel, to Tony Cox, Chair, CASAC, E-37–E-39 (Dec. 10, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/24X4-G8T7. 
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In the most far-reaching measure to date, EPA issued a directive 
barring scientists receiving EPA grants from serving on any of the agency’s 
advisory committees.106 The directive’s stated purpose was to avoid “the 
appearance or reality of potential interference with [committee members’] 
ability to independently and objectively serve.”107 However, the directive has 
been widely criticized. Noting that pre-existing policies already addressed the 
alleged conflicts, one prominent scientific organization denounced the 
directive as “motivated by politics, not the desire for quality scientific 
information.”108 Other critics noted that the directive ignores more serious 
conflicts faced by committee members who work for industry or receive 
industry funding—and whom the directive does not bar from serving.109 
Indeed, inconsistent application of the directive in the year since its issuance 
has cast further doubt on its stated purpose of ensuring objectivity.110  
Historically, EPA advisory committees have been comprised 
primarily of academics.111 However, the recent changes have sidelined 
academic experts in favor of expanded industry representation.112 Reliance 
on industry experts for advice can be problematic because such experts’ 
employers often have a financial stake in resulting regulations.113 Moreover, 
CASAC has come to be dominated by state regulators who have little 
background in research on the health effects of air pollution and who hail 
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Conservatives to the Mix, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2017; https://perma.cc/JYJ4-NQPG; @see 
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#113 @See Jennifer Sass, Correspondence, Credibility of Scientists: Conflict of Interest and 
Bias, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A147, A147–A148 (2006); @see also Sheldon 
Krimsky & Tim Schwab, Conflicts of Interests among Committee Members in the National 
Academies’ Genetically Engineered Crop Study, 12 PLOS ONE E0172317, 2017, at 2 
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outcomes consistent with those companies’ financial interests). 
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from states that have been hostile to stringent air pollution rules.114 Similarly, 
recent appointees to the SAB include leading proponents of deregulation, 
climate change skeptics, and recipients of industry funding who have 
attacked mainstream climate science and questioned widely recognized 
pollution problems.115 For example, the chair of the SAB, Michael 
Honeycutt, has attracted attention for downplaying the risks of exposure to 
ozone and mercury.116  
 Measures to stack, alter, or sideline scientific advisory boards have 
not been limited to EPA or to narrow issues. At the Departments of 
Commerce, Energy, and Interior,—as well as at EPA—the frequency of 
science advisory committee meetings and/or number of committee members 
in 2017 reached their lowest levels since the government began collecting 
such data in 1997.117 And across the federal government, advisory 
committees that work on climate change-related issues have been dissolved 
or allowed to expire.118  
Worries about the politicization of scientific advisory committees are 
not novel. President Obama’s CASAC appointments were criticized for 
lacking geographical and ideological diversity.119 The George W. Bush 
Administration was attacked for appointing scientists with ties to industry 
and asking potential nominees about their political preferences and their 
views on capital punishment and abortion.120 And under President Reagan, 
EPA compiled a covert “hit list” of scientific advisors to eliminate from its 
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advisory boards.121 These earlier efforts, however, focused on committee 
appointments and generally did not extend to committees’ existence and use. 
Finally, policy decisions involving science have sometimes been 
driven by factors other than science. EPA Administrator Pruitt reportedly 
relied on lawyers, lobbyists, and Republican state attorneys general, rather 
than agency scientists and staff, to make policy decisions.122 In one 
rulemaking, EPA cited as scientific support a source that did not involve a 
scientific study at all.123 And in another rulemaking, the Trump 
Administration criticized an Obama-era rule for “plac[ing] too much 
emphasis” on information and conclusions from a scientific report.124  
C. Censorship of Agency Science 
A third category of Trump Administration actions hostile to science 
includes political interference with the work of agency scientists and 
politicization of speech relating to climate change and other subjects. These 
actions raise concerns regarding scientific integrity and censorship. 
Agencies rely on their own scientists to conduct research and to 
review and analyze the work of scientists outside the agency.125 However, 
political interference can undermine the integrity of government scientists’ 
work and the science-driven policies that rely on their work. In one example 
of such interference, EPA blocked one of its research ecologists from 
delivering a keynote conference address on climate change and other factors 
affecting the health of Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay.126 While an agency 
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#122 @See Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration Under Trump, 28–29 (UC 
Berkeley Pub. Law Res. Paper, 2017). 
#123 @See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Amid Ethics Scrutiny, EPA’s Pruitt also Finds 
his Regulatory Rollbacks Hitting Bumps, WASH. POST (May 20, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/B6N7-G99G.  
#124 @ Definition of “Waters of the United States”–Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 32227, 32241 (Proposed July 
6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). 
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23, 2017, at A16. The administration has also pressured scientists outside the agency to 
alter the content of scientific presentations. For example, the National Park Service 
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spokesman contended that “EPA scientists . . . are not presenting, it is not an 
EPA conference,”127 the incident prompted Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D-
R.I.) to express concern that EPA was censoring scientific findings on climate 
change. Then-Administrator Pruitt responded with a pledge that 
“[p]rocedures have been put in place to prevent such an occurrence in the 
future” and reaffirmed the agency’s commitment to its policy of scientific 
integrity.128 
Pruitt’s pledge has not eased concerns about censorship. The Trump 
Administration’s skepticism toward climate change has prompted worries 
that political officials would alter scientific reports or suppress scientific 
inquiry in order to reduce climate change’s public visibility and undermine 
the case for a government response.129 Online access to climate change data 
and reports at EPA, the Department of the Interior, and other agencies has 
been curbed.130 References to climate change have disappeared from agency 
websites.131 Agency staffers removed mentions of climate change from 
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reports and rescinded directives relating to climate change.132 Additionally, 
researchers outside the government have been asked to remove the terms 
“climate change” and “global warming” from federal grant proposals.133 In 
an unprecedented step, political appointees at EPA and the Department of the 
Interior now review grants to universities and outside groups—a move that 
could undermine the integrity of contracting processes and subvert research 
priorities previously determined by Congress.134 In addition, the 
Administration has halted research projects aimed at identifying health and 
safety risks associated with fossil fuel extraction.135 While some climate 
change work continues within the federal government, it is subject to the 
messaging efforts and potential interference of political officials.136  
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 Adverse personnel actions also may constitute censorship. In July 
2017, the Interior Department reassigned fifty senior career officials, 
ostensibly to “match[] . . . their skill sets with mission and operational 
requirements.”137 Among them was the Interior Department’s top climate 
change official, Joel Clement, who was reassigned to an office responsible 
for collecting oil and gas royalty payments.138 Clement had highlighted the 
dangers climate change poses for Alaska Native communities, and the other 
reassigned officials had also worked on climate change and other scientific 
issues.139  EPA also has witnessed personnel changes that could negatively 
impact scientific inquiry critical to protecting public health and the 
environment. Ruth Etzel, the director of EPA’s Office of Children’s Health 
Protection, was abruptly placed on administrative leave, just as EPA was 
preparing a federal strategy for combating lead exposure.140 And within the 
Trump Administration’s first year, hundreds of scientists left the agency in 
the wake of proposed budget cuts and harsh criticism from political 
leaders.141 
 Efforts to censor agency science are not unique to the Trump 
Administration. Political appointees in the George W. Bush Administration 
blocked agency scientists from publishing papers and making presentations, 
asked agency scientists to change information or conclusions in scientific 
reports, and edited scientific conclusions in reports and documents.142 In one 
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incident, Bush White House officials demanded revision of an EPA report to 
eliminate the conclusion that climate change has global health and 
environmental consequences and to incorporate contrary language from a 
study funded by the American Petroleum Institute.143 And notwithstanding 
public pronouncements to the contrary, executive branch officials have long 
impeded the ability of agency scientists to communicate with the media and 
with Congress through preclearance requirements, denials of interview 
requests, and other restrictive practices.144 The Obama Administration 
engaged in some of these practices and also sought to control 
communications by aggressively prosecuting government employees who 
leaked classified or confidential information.145 
 
D. Characterizing the Trump Administration’s Actions 
 Viewed against the President’s frequent misleading statements, the 
Trump Administration’s disregard of scientific facts and expertise is no 
surprise.146 Indeed, there is a risk of overstating the broader effects of the 
Administration’s anti-scientific measures. Despite outcries regarding the 
“war on science,” the Trump Administration is hardly dismantling science 
itself, nor is it clear that it could do so. Government-supported research 
continues—although the government shutdown delayed new research awards 
and review of research proposals—and much scientific inquiry takes place 
outside the government.147 In fact, federal research and development 
spending for the 2018 fiscal year totaled an estimated $176.8 billion, its 
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highest level ever, even after accounting for inflation.148 Overall levels of 
public confidence in science and scientists remain relatively high.149 And the 
Trump Administration has expressed enthusiasm for certain categories of 
science and technology, including artificial intelligence and manned space 
exploration.150 Under President Trump, the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy has supported efforts to expand Internet access, promote 
the use of self-flying drones, and advance artificial intelligence research.151 
Further reflection on the distinction between research science and 
regulatory science suggests that the Trump Administration is engaged in a 
war on regulatory science, not a war on research science. Like other recent 
Republican administrations, the Trump Administration is reversing 
numerous regulatory measures aimed at protecting health and the 
environment. Those regulatory measures rely heavily on scientific data, and 
thus it is unsurprising that Republican administrations “attack science’s 
forms of truth-making, its databases, and its budgets . . . as part of a coherent 
strategy to weaken the power of the federal agencies that rely on them.”152 
As Clark Miller has explained, “[w]hat appears to be a war on science . . . is 
a war on a form of government with which science has become deeply aligned 
and allied over the past century.”153  
Scientific knowledge can serve purposes other than regulation: 
industry can use science to innovate, and government agencies can use 
science to achieve missions ranging from national defense to space 
exploration. Even regulatory scientific activity need not lead to regulation; an 
agency that studies a perceived threat might conclude that the threat is not 
significant or that regulation is not an appropriate response. However, in the 
absence of regulatory scientific data, regulation is unlikely to emerge or 
survive. As former EPA administrator Gina McCarthy and a colleague put it, 
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“Mr. Pruitt’s goal is simple: No studies, no data, no rules.”154 Administrator 
Wheeler’s commitment to finalizing the secret science rule suggests a similar 
objective.155 In the “deconstruction of the administrative state” pledged by 
former Trump advisor Steve Bannon, regulatory science is a prime target.156 
In this struggle, regulatory science is not defenseless. As the next Part 
explains, many of the Administration’s actions are (or will be) subject to 
litigation, and courts have an essential role in ensuring those actions are 
reasoned and empirically based. Nonetheless, some of the Administration’s 
actions lie beyond the reach of the judiciary and could have lasting impacts 
on the relationship between law and science.  
III. Laws Relevant to the War on Regulatory Science 
 Various laws are relevant to the war on regulatory science, including 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Federal Advisory Committee 
Act (FACA), laws governing conflicts of interest, the First Amendment, and 
whistleblower protections. As it turns out, limited aspects of the Trump 
Administration’s war on regulatory science are subject to enforceable legal 
constraints. In some instances, applicable law grants the executive branch 
wide discretion, and in other instances, no enforceable laws apply.  
A. The Administrative Procedure Act  
 Final agency actions, including the issuance of new rules, revocation 
of previously issued rules, and granting of permits, are generally subject to 
judicial review under the APA. Indeed, several of the Trump 
Administration’s actions delaying or suspending Obama-era rules have been 
successfully challenged for failing to comply with APA requirements.157 
Further litigation can be expected once new substantive rules are finalized. 
With federal agencies serving as the central battleground for the war on 
regulatory science, judicial review under the APA offers an important 
mechanism for guarding against some abuses of science.  
1. Judicial Review under the APA 
 The APA authorizes judicial review of “[a]gency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other 
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adequate remedy in a court.”158 Such review most commonly occurs under 
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard159—“a collection of more 
particularized inquiries into specific components of agency decision making, 
rather than a uniform assessment of the rationality of an agency’s 
decision.”160 Courts examine whether an agency relied only on factors 
intended by Congress, considered important aspects of a problem, articulated 
a rational connection between its choice and the underlying facts, or offered 
an explanation supported by the evidence before it.161 And if an agency 
changes its position, courts require the agency to provide a reasoned 
explanation “for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were 
engendered by the prior policy.”162 While sometimes characterized as “hard 
look” review, arbitrary and capricious review is a deferential approach that 
reflects notions of “agency expertise and political accountability.”163 
 How might arbitrary and capricious review apply to the war on 
regulatory science? Environmental regulatory decisions typically incorporate 
“a series of sub-decisions that alternate or zigzag between science and 
science-policy.”164 Courts might be asked to review scientific data or policy 
judgments, and substantive as well as procedural issues.165 Challenges might 
allege that an agency ignored credible scientific data, based its decision on 
unreliable or insufficient data, incorporated unreasonable scientific models, 
relied on a biased advisory committee, or disregarded input from an advisory 
committee.166  
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 In evaluating such challenges, courts may hesitate to second-guess an 
agency’s scientific determinations.167 As noted above, agencies typically 
assess health and environmental risks through a “weight-of-the-evidence” 
approach that considers the totality of the available scientific information.168 
Courts’ “super deference” to agencies’ scientific assessments is based on a 
sense that agencies possess scientific expertise that generalist judges do 
not.169  
 However, many issues that courts review in fact do not require 
scientific expertise and thus neither warrant nor receive super deference.170 
For example, determining whether an agency included adequate procedures 
for ensuring data reliability or whether an agency considered relevant data 
are relatively straightforward questions of administrative law.171 
Furthermore, many challenges to science-based decisions involve an 
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decisions using the “best available science.” @See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) 
(Endangered Species Act provision governing listing of protected species); @id. § 
1536(a)(2) (Endangered Species Act provision governing determination of whether 
proposed federal action jeopardizes continued existence of species or adversely modifies 
critical habitat); @id. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (Marine Mammal Protection Act provision 
governing permits to allow take of marine mammals); @id. § 1851(a)(2) (Magnuson-
Stevenson Act provision governing fishery conservation and management measures). 
Various commentators have concluded, however, that these provisions “essentially 
duplicate the background requirements of the [APA] and other general limitations on 
agency decisions making.” @Holly Doremus, The Purposes, Effects, and Future of the 
Endangered Species Act’s Best Available Science Mandate, 34 ENVTL. L. 397, 421 (2004); 
@see also J.B. Ruhl, The Battle Over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 
555, 581–82 (2004); @Elizabeth Kuhn, Science and Deference: The “Best Available 
Science” Mandate Is a Fiction in the Ninth Circuit, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (Oct. 
23, 2016), https://gelr.org/2016/10/23/science-and-deference/. 
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agency’s alleged failure to explain itself in a reasoned manner—another issue 
courts are well-equipped to review.172 In practice, courts rarely are called on 
to address actual errors in the science or other purely scientific questions that 
demand scientific expertise.173 
2. APA Challenges to Delays or Suspensions of Obama-Era 
Rules 
 In President Trump’s first year, regulatory agencies focused on 
delaying or suspending rules issued by the Obama Administration.174 
Challenges to these actions centered on basic questions of administrative law 
rather than on agency science, and courts have invalidated several actions that 
were taken without notice-and-comment rulemaking.175 In these actions, Lisa 
Heinzerling observes, agencies paid “little attention to legal authority, 
process, or reason giving, and in doing so . . . violated basic principles of 
administrative law.”176  
 To buy additional time to issue substantive replacements for the 
Obama rules, agencies in several instances issued a second round of rule 
suspensions. In one example, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
suspended a 2016 rule governing methane emissions from oil and gas 
operations.177 In a second case, EPA delayed by twenty months the effective 
                                                 
#172 @See Meazell, supra note 159, at 749, 779. 
#173 @See Wagner, supra note 45, at 72 (suggesting that “there are surprisingly few 
examples of EPA using unreliable science or using science inappropriately to support a 
final regulation”). 
#174 @See Heinzerling, supra note 157, at 14. 
#175 @See, e.g., Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 8–14 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (vacating 
EPA stay of rule regulating methane emissions from oil and gas facilities, and rejecting 
EPA contention that it had inherent or statutory authority to issue stay); @Becerra v. Dep’t 
of Interior, 276 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964–65 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that APA did not 
authorize defendants to postpone implementation of final rule on mineral valuation where 
effective date of rule had already passed); @California v. Bureau of Land Management, 
277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1118–24 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (vacating postponement of compliance 
date for Bureau of Land Management rule limiting natural gas waste from federal leases 
because postponement without notice and comment was unauthorized); @NRDC v. Perry, 
302 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1100–01 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (ordering Department of Energy to 
publish energy conservation standards adopted in December 2016 but never published in 
the Federal Register); NRDC v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2019 WL 
858748, at *14-*17 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (holding that Department of Energy’s issuance of stay 
indefinitely postponing effective date of test procedure rule regarding energy efficiency of 
air conditioners and heat pumps was arbitrary and capricious). 
#176 @Heinzerling, supra note 156, at 16. 
#177 @BLM, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties and Resource 
Conservation, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050, 58,051 (Dec. 8, 2017) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 
3160, 3170) (expressing desire to avoid enforcing 2016 rule requirements “that might be 
rescinded or significantly revised in the near future”). 
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date of a rule designed to prevent accidental chemical releases from industrial 
facilities.178 And in a third instance, EPA and the Corps of Engineers 
purported to establish a 2020 “applicability date” for a 2015 rule defining the 
“waters of the United States” subject to regulation under the Clean Water 
Act.179  
 In none of these cases did the agencies meaningfully grapple with the 
substantive justification for the rule being suspended, a point underscored in 
legal challenges.180 To support its suspension of the rule governing methane 
emissions, BLM cited “concerns regarding the [rule’s] statutory authority, 
cost, complexity, feasibility, and other implications.”181 To support its delay 
of the accidental release rule, EPA contended that it needed additional time 
to reconsider the rule.182 And to support their action on the “waters of the 
United States” rule, EPA and the Corps similarly cited the need to “provid[e] 
continuity and regulatory certainty . . . while the agencies continue to 
consider possible revisions to the 2015 Rule.”183 In light of the agencies’ 
proffered rationales, legal challenges were resolved without any scientific 
expertise by applying basic principles of administrative law.184  
                                                 
#178 @ Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133, 27,133 (June 14, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
#179 @Department of Defense, Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an 
Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) 
(stating intent to continue to administer pre-2015 regulations while considering revisions to 
2015 rule) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 
232, 300, 302, 401).  
180 For a summary of litigation surrounding the BLM actions, see Harvard Environmental 
& Energy Law Program, BLM Methane Waste Prevention Rule, 
https://eelp.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/bam-methane-waste-prevention-rule/. For a 
discussion of the litigation involving the waters of the U.S. rule, see Ariel Wittenberg, 
States, Greens Sue over Trump Admin’s WOTUS Delay, E&E NEWS PM (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2018/02/06/stories/1060073053 [TE: need perma link 
for both cites] 
#181 @Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,051 58,051 (Dec. 8, 2017) 
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160 and 3170). 
#182 @Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under 
the Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133, 27,135 (June 13, 
2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68). 
#183 @Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328). 
#184 @California v. BLM, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1065–76 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (granting 
preliminary injunction against BLM suspension rule); @Air All. Houston v. EPA, 906 F.3d 
1049, 1060–69 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that EPA lacked authority to delay earlier rule 
designed to prevent accidental chemical releases and that its delay rule was arbitrary and 
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3. APA Challenges to Substantive Rules 
 In many instances, the final content of the Trump Administration’s 
substantive rules and the rationales supporting those rules are undetermined. 
However, consideration of EPA’s secret science proposal and BLM’s rule on 
methane emissions suggests issues that are likely to arise.  
a. EPA’s Secret Science Rule 
 As proposed, EPA’s “secret science” rule would prohibit the agency 
from issuing rules based on studies that use confidential data.185 Assuming it 
is finalized, the rule would function as a meta-rule governing future 
rulemaking by EPA.186 A direct legal challenge to the rule might run afoul of 
ripeness and standing defenses, based on an argument that the rule’s actual 
effects are too uncertain to be evaluated.187 However, the substance of the 
rule would be reviewable once the rule is applied in a subsequent rulemaking. 
 At that stage, courts would face the question of whether it is arbitrary 
and capricious for EPA to disregard scientific studies that rely on confidential 
data. Some statutes—such as the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act—require EPA to rely on the “best available science” 
when issuing regulations.188 Ignoring peer-reviewed and validated studies 
solely because they rely on confidential data seemingly would violate that 
mandate. Even rules promulgated under statutes that do not explicitly demand 
use of the “best available science” would be subject to hard look review 
requiring “an agency making a decision with substantial scientific content 
[to] explain how its decision follows from, or at least is not inconsistent with, 
scientific evidence of which the agency has been made aware.”189  
                                                 
capricious); @South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 
963–67 (D.S.C. 2018) (invalidating suspension of 2015 rule defining “waters of the United 
States” on ground that agencies’ refusal to consider comments on substance of rule violated 
APA). 
#185 @See supra Section II.A.1. 
#186 @See Eric Roston, Pruitt Proposes Limits to Scientific Research Used by EPA Staff, 
BLOOMBERG, Apr. 24, 2018, https://perma.cc/YR4C-J7AF. Administrator Pruitt 
emphatically characterized the measure as a binding “rule,” as opposed to a guiding 
“memo” or “policy.” @Id. 
#187 @In Public Citizen, Inc. v. Trump, the court dismissed a challenge to President 
Trump’s executive order requiring the elimination of two regulations for every new 
regulation issued. Among the reasons for dismissal was the failure to identify particular 
persons who would be harmed and the failure to allege that the relevant agency would have 
issued a desired rule. @Pub. Citizen Inc. v. Trump, 297 F. Supp. 3d 6, 12–13 (D.D.C. 
2018). The government would likely seek to dismiss a direct challenge to EPA’s secret 
science rule on similar grounds. 
#188 @15 U.S.C. § 2625(h) (2012); @42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
#189 @Doremus, supra note 171, at 423. 
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 Challenges to EPA rules have sometimes argued that EPA must 
obtain and publicize the data underlying the studies that the agency relies 
on.190 However, the D.C. Circuit has twice rejected that argument, explaining 
that such a requirement would be “impractical and unnecessary,” and “much 
plainly relevant scientific information would become unavailable” as a 
result.191 This line of reasoning undercuts the secret science rule and suggests 
that it would be arbitrary and capricious for EPA to disregard studies because 
they are based on confidential data. 
b. BLM’s Methane Rule 
 BLM’s rule on methane emissions also could be legally vulnerable.192 
Under President Obama, BLM issued a rule to reduce atmospheric releases 
of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, from oil and gas operations on 
federal lands.193 In eliminating significant portions of that rule, BLM now 
questions its statutory authority to issue the rule and also cites reasons relating 
primarily to cost: according to the agency, the 2016 “rule’s compliance costs 
for industry and implementation costs for the BLM exceed the rule’s 
benefits,” and compliance burdens could make it uneconomical for marginal 
or low-producing wells to continue to operate.194 
 At first glance, scientific rationales appear absent from the agency’s 
reasoning. However, a closer examination of BLM’s assertions reveals a mix 
of scientific, economic, and policy determinations.195 Namely, calculations 
of the rule’s costs and benefits depend in large part on the social cost of 
carbon—an estimate of the long-term economic damage done by a ton of 
                                                 
#190 @American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 372 (D.C. Cir. 2002); @Coalition 
of Battery Recyclers Ass’n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
#191 @American Trucking Ass’ns, 283 F.3d at 372. 
#192 @The rule is the subject of multiple lawsuits. California et al. v. Zinke, No.3:18-cv-
05712 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 18, 2018); @Sierra Club et al. v. Zinke et al., No.3:18-cv-
05984 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 28, 2018). 
#193 @See Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 
81 Fed. Reg. 83,008, 83,014 (2016). 
#194 @Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 49,184, 49,185–87 (2018); 
@see also Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924, 7924–26 (2018) 
(preamble to proposed rule noting cost, complexity, and “unnecessary compliance burdens” 
associated with 2016 rule); @cf. Exec. Order No. 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence 
and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (2017) (emphasizing need to “avoid[] 
regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy production”). 
#195 @See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE 
PROPOSED RULE TO RESCIND OR REVISE CERTAIN REQUIREMENTS OF THE 2016 WASTE 
PREVENTION RULE (2018), https://perma.cc/V4E4-ALNG. 
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carbon emissions in a given year.196 Shortly after taking office, the Trump 
Administration drastically reduced official estimates of the social cost of 
carbon from about $42 per ton to between $1 and $6 per ton.197 To achieve 
this result, the new Administration excluded the non-domestic benefits of 
reduced GHG emissions from consideration, increased the discount rate used 
to value future impacts (thus giving those impacts less weight), reduced 
estimates of damage from climate change, and altered the projected 
relationship between higher temperatures and economic impacts.198 In short, 
embedded in the cost-benefit analysis of the rule are complex scientific and 
economic judgments that require justification and supporting data. If agencies 
disregard scientific data or exhibit unreasoned decisionmaking in the face of 
such data, the APA authorizes courts to invalidate such actions.  
B. Statutes Governing Advisory Committees 
 Review under the APA is likely to be the most important judicial 
check on the Trump Administration’s war on regulatory science. Other, more 
specific, statutes that operate in conjunction with the APA or authorize their 
own causes of action also may be relevant to the war on regulatory science. 
 Notably, changes to science advisory committees may implicate the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act. Enacted to increase the transparency and 
accountability of federal advisory committees, FACA sets out standards 
governing how these committees are established and operated.199 Advisory 
committee meetings must be open to the public, and committee documents 
must be publicly available.200 Committee membership must “be fairly 
balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be 
performed,” and there must be adequate assurance “that the advice and 
recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately 
influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest.”201 
                                                 
#196 @EPA, The Social Cost of Carbon, https://perma.cc/4NKF-VSC5. 
#197 @Exec. Order 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 at 16,095–96; @Chelsea Harvey, Trump 
Team’s Wonky CO2 Calculation is a Big Deal, E&E NEWS, Oct. 25, 2017,  
https://perma.cc/6W38-TFZB. 
#198 @See Harvey, supra note 197; @Richard L. Revesz & Jack Lienke, Opinion, The 
EPA’s Smoke and Mirrors on Climate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2017; @see also Richard S.J. 
Tol, The Social Cost of Carbon, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE MACROECONOMICS OF 
GLOBAL WARMING § 13.3 (Lucas Bernard & Willi Semmler, eds. 2014) (discussing 
various parameters that affect social cost of carbon). 
#199 @5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1–16 (2012); see Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Dept. of 
Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1106 (11th Cir. 1994). 
#200 @5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 10 (2012). 
#201 @5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b) (2012) (establishing requirements for advisory committees 
created by Congress); @see also id. § 5(c) (applying same requirements to advisory 
committees created by the President or agency officials). 
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However, as explained below, plaintiffs seeking to enforce FACA’s 
requirements may encounter challenges in demonstrating standing and 
justiciability.202 Furthermore, even if a court reaches the substantive merits, 
FACA allows agencies fairly broad discretion in appointing and using 
advisory committees. 
1. Standing 
 Standing requires plaintiffs in federal court to demonstrate that they 
have suffered a particularized injury, the defendant caused the injury, and a 
legal judgment would redress the injury.203 Ordinary members of the public 
may face difficulty in establishing that a not “fairly balanced” advisory 
committee or “inappropriately influenced” committee advice caused them 
particularized injury.204 A regulated industry might present a stronger case 
for particularized injury if a committee is fashioned in favor of a rival 
industry,205 but not if an industry is well-represented. Perhaps the strongest 
claimants of particularized injury—and standing to challenge the Trump 
Administration’s policies regarding advisory committee membership—
would be individuals who are removed from an advisory committee or who 
lost an opportunity to be considered for appointment.206 Similarly, committee 
                                                 
#202 Although FACA itself does not provide a cause of action, claims that an agency has 
failed to comply with FACA may be brought under the APA’s judicial review provisions. 
@See Center for Biol. Diversity v. Tidwell, 239 F. Supp.3d 213, 221 (D.D.C. 2017); 
@Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 736 F. Supp. 2d 24, 30–31 (D.D.C. 
2010) (citing cases from other circuits). Indeed, plaintiffs need not wait for an agency to act 
on the recommendations of a faulty committee; creation of an improperly constituted 
committee and a committee’s failure to adhere to procedural requirements are reviewable 
final actions. @Judicial Watch, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 39–40. 
#203 @Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
#204 @See id. at 573–74 (discussing cases holding that plaintiffs may not raise generalized 
grievances). @Cf. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–25 (1998) (noting that widely shared 
injuries may be sufficiently concrete to constitute injury in fact, as where many individuals 
are injured in a mass tort case, many voters suffer interference with voting rights, or many 
persons are deprived of information directly related to voting). 
#205 @See Cargill Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that mine owners 
had suffered an injury in fact from alleged FACA violations and therefore had standing to 
bring FACA claims). 
#206 @See Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.2d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding 
standing based on “plaintiffs’ claim of an interest in a fair opportunity to be appointed,” 
which was denied when fair balance requirement was not met); @Northwest Ecosystem 
Alliance v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, No. C99-1165R, 1999 WL 33526001 
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs suffered injury sufficient to establish standing 
“from the very act of being omitted: lack of access to sensitive information and the 
inability to provide decisionmakers with contrary viewpoints”); @cf. Compl. at ¶¶ 89–100, 
Physicians for Soc. Responsibility et al. v. Pruitt, 359 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D.D.C. 2019) (No. 
1:17-cv-02742) (alleging that EPA grantees wishing to serve on advisory committees have 
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members who are now ineligible to receive EPA grants are potential 
candidates to challenge EPA’s directive excluding grant recipients from 
advisory committee service.207 
2. Justiciability 
 The justiciability doctrines offer further potential grounds to dismiss 
a FACA challenge as unsuited for judicial review.208 Among the more serious 
justiciability concerns is a lack of judicially manageable standards. Namely, 
how can a court determine (1) which groups should be represented on a 
“fairly balanced” committee, (2) that such groups are not currently 
represented, (3) that the existing balance of viewpoints is not fair, and (4) that 
addition of a specific number of representatives would make the balance 
fair?209  
The federal appellate courts have largely deemed such challenges 
justiciable, but not without some disagreement. Public Citizen v. National 
Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods featured 
contrasting views of justiciability from two respected D.C. Circuit judges.210 
Finding “[t]he relevant points of view on issues to be considered by an 
advisory committee [] virtually infinite,” Judge Laurence Silberman 
concluded that FACA offers “no principled basis for a federal court to 
determine which among the myriad points of view deserve representation on 
                                                 
standing to challenge EPA directive excluding EPA grant recipients from committee 
service).  
#207 @See Physicians for Soc. Responsibility v. Wheeler, 359 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35–38 
(D.D.C. 2019) (holding that former member removed from EPA Science Advisory Board 
and scientists who faced imminent removal from advisory panel or loss of EPA grant 
funding had sufficiently alleged standing); @see also Sharon Jacobs, Advising the EPA: 
The Insidious Undoing of Expert Government, HARV. L. REV. BLOG, (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/F6SA-Y9XB. Redressability also may pose an obstacle for would-be 
FACA plaintiffs. While one judge has contended that a FACA violation can be “easily 
remedied by . . . an injunction suspending operation of the Committee until [the interests 
allegedly omitted] are represented on it,” @Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. on 
Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Edwards, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part), other judges might hesitate to determine whether 
a committee is fairly balanced. @Public Citizen, 886 F.2d at 431 (Silberman, J., 
concurring). And even if a plaintiff succeeds in obtaining an injunction, an agency might 
choose to proceed without a functioning advisory committee in place. 
#208 @See Physicians for Soc. Responsibility, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 43–50 (holding that 
“fairly balanced” and “inappropriately influenced” provisions of FACA “provide no 
meaningful standard of review”); @see also Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 
86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 76–77 (2007).  
#209 @Public Citizen, 886 F.2d at 431 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
#210 @Id. at 419 (per curiam). In some cases, courts have addressed the substantive merits 
of “fairly balanced” challenges without explicitly addressing justiciability. @See, e.g., 
Nat’l Anti-Hunger Coal. v. Exec. Comm., 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
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particular advisory committees.”211 In contrast, Judge Harry Edwards found 
“nothing in FACA or its legislative history to indicate that the ‘fairly 
balanced’ requirement affords executive discretion sufficient . . . to find that 
‘there is no law to apply.’”212 Relying heavily on D.C. Circuit precedents, the 
Fifth Circuit subsequently concluded that “[t]he weight of the case law” 
supported a finding of justiciability.213 The Tenth Circuit later “adopt[ed] the 
reasoning of the Fifth and D.C. Circuits” without analyzing justiciability in 
depth.214  
The justiciability of a “fairly balanced” claim may depend on whether 
a specific statute governs the composition of an advisory committee. For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit held the “fairly balanced” requirement 
nonjusticiable as applied to the Trade Act of 1974.215 Noting that FACA 
“does not . . . articulate what perspectives must be considered in determining 
if an advisory committee is fairly balanced,” the Ninth Circuit explained that 
the political branches, rather than the courts, were best suited to apply and 
review the “fairly balanced” requirement in light of the complexities of U.S. 
trade and the lack of statutory guidance.216  
3. Merits 
 A FACA plaintiff who overcomes preliminary obstacles to 
substantive review is hardly guaranteed success on the merits. With respect 
to whether committee membership is “fairly balanced” or a committee’s 
recommendations are “inappropriately influenced,” agencies have broad 
discretion.  
The “fairly balanced” requirement applies to the “functions to be 
performed” and “the points of view represented” by an advisory 
committee.217 Agencies might satisfy the requirement by selecting members 
from diverse educational and professional backgrounds or a range of interest 
                                                 
#211 @886 F.2d at 426 (Friedman, J., concurring). 
#212 @Id. at 433 (Edwards, J., concurring). The other panel member, Judge Friedman, 
wrote separately without discussing justiciability and found no violation of the “fairly 
balanced” requirement. @Id. at 420–26 (Friedman, J., concurring). 
#213 @Cargill Inc. v. U.S., 173 F.3d 323, 334–35 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that courts could 
ensure that persons directly affected by an advisory’s committee work have some 
committee representation). 
#214 @Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. Wenker, 353 F.3d 1221, 1232–33 (10th Cir. 2004). 
#215 @Ctr. for Policy Analysis on Trade and Health v. Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, 540 F.3d 940, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2008). 
#216 @Id. at 945-47. Similarly, the “inappropriately influenced” language of FACA has 
been held nonjusticiable in at least some circumstances. Physicians Comm. for Responsible 
Med. v. Vilsack, No. 16-cv-00069, 2016 WL 5930585, at *3–*8 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
#217 @5 U.S.C. app. 2 § 5(b)(2) (2012). @See Cargill, 173 F.3d at 332–38. 
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groups or other affiliations.218 Agencies have “considerable discretion” in 
establishing advisory committees, as a D.C. Circuit case, National Anti-
Hunger Coalition, illustrates.219 That opinion upheld a lower court finding 
that a committee appointed to study social service programs was fairly 
balanced even though “no public interest representative or beneficiaries of 
[those] programs” were included.220 Exclusive reliance on corporate 
executives, the court concluded, was an appropriate way to achieve the 
committee’s function of “apply[ing] private sector expertise to attain cost-
effective management.”221 
A Fifth Circuit opinion, Cargill v. U.S., similarly acknowledged 
agencies’ broad discretion to compose advisory committees in light of their 
intended functions. The court rejected an argument by mine owners for 
including company representatives or scientists on a committee charged with 
reviewing a scientific protocol.222 As the court explained, “[t]he task of the 
committee—providing scientific peer review—is politically neutral and 
technocratic.”223 Accordingly, the exclusion of mine company 
representatives and scientists did not demonstrate bias in the points of view 
represented by committee members.224 
Plaintiffs also face an uphill battle in establishing that the advice of 
an advisory committee is “inappropriately influenced.” The “inappropriately 
influenced” standard is intended to counter “‘the danger of allowing special 
interest groups to exercise undue influence upon the Government through the 
dominance of advisory committees which deal with matters in which they 
have vested interests.’”225 However, neither the participation of industry 
representatives, agency grant recipients, or former or potential employees 
                                                 
#218 @See Sidney A. Shapiro, Public Accountability of Advisory Committees, 1 RISK: 
ISSUES HEALTH & SAFETY 189, 194–95 (1990). 
#219 @See National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074; @see also Cargill, 173 
F.3d at 336; @Public Citizen v. Nat’l Advisory Comm. On Microbiological Criteria for 
Foods, 886 F.2d 419, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Friedman, J., concurring) (“fairly balanced” 
determination “necessarily lies largely within the discretion of the official who appoints the 
committee”); @Daniel E. Walters, Note, The Justiciability of Fair Balance Under the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act: Toward a Deliberative Process Approach, 110 MICH. L. 
REV. 677, 681 (2012) (discussing cases). 
#220 @National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d at 1074.  
#221 @711 F.2d at 1074. 
#222 @173 F.3d at 338. 
#223 @173 F.3d at 338. 
#224 @See id. 
#225 @Public Citizen, 886 F.2d at 424 (Friedman, J., concurring) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 
1017, at 6, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3496). 
40 
 
demonstrates inappropriate influence per se.226 As the Fifth Circuit stated in 
Cargill: 
Working for or receiving a grant from HHS [the Department of Health 
and Human Services], or co-authoring a paper with a person affiliated 
with the department, does not impair a scientist’s ability to provide 
technical, scientific peer review of a study sponsored by HHS or one 
of its agencies. Moreover, if HHS were required to exclude from peer 
review committees all scientists who somehow had been affiliated 
with the department, it would have to eliminate many of those most 
qualified to give advice.227 
This language underscores agencies’ discretion to constitute advisory 
committees as appropriate.228 At the same time, its reasoning directly 
contradicts EPA’s policy of barring EPA grant recipients from serving on its 
advisory committees.  
 How might FACA apply to the Trump EPA’s handling of advisory 
committees? Although the case law is generally unfavorable to plaintiffs, a 
“fairly balanced” or “inappropriately influenced” challenge to an EPA 
advisory committee might be successful under some circumstances. A facial 
challenge to EPA’s directive on grant recipients would be difficult. Even with 
the directive in place, a specific advisory committee may be “fairly balanced” 
and its advice not “inappropriately influenced.” However, heavy reliance on 
industry representatives to populate advisory committees could run afoul of 
FACA’s text as well as its purpose of ending industry domination of advisory 
bodies.229 Committees that address substantive policy issues may have to 
include representatives of those affected by potential policy changes.230 For 
example, a committee making recommendations on pollution standards 
should include a voice for persons who might suffer ill effects of pollution 
                                                 
#226 See Cargill, 173 F.3d at 339; Public Citizen, 886 F.2d at 425 (Friedman, J., 
concurring) (rejecting claim of inappropriate influence where six of eighteen committee 
members were employed by industry and four other members had done consulting or other 
work on behalf of industry). 
#227 @173 F.3d at 339. 
#228 @Cf. Physicians for Social Responsibility v. Wheeler, 359 F. Supp. 3d 27, 48 (D.D.C. 
2019) (“evaluating the relative qualifications of potential committee members is exactly the 
kind of discretionary decision making that is precluded from judicial review”). 
#229 @See Northwest Ecosystem Alliance, 1999 WL 33526001 at *6. 
#230 @See National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm., 566 F. Supp. 1515, 1517 
(D.D.C. 1983) (holding that task force was not fairly balanced with respect to 
recommendations to repeal benefits, where task force included no representatives of 
benefits programs); see also @Public Citizen, 886 F.2d at 436–37 (Edwards, J., concurring 
and dissenting) (contending that committee charged with recommending regulations 
affecting health and safety of food products was required to include representatives of 
consumer interests). 
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exposure. Likewise, committees charged with reviewing the scientific basis 
of proposed regulations should have members with relevant scientific 
expertise.231 If a FACA violation is found, a trial court has discretion to craft 
injunctive relief “that will encourage compliance with FACA’s strictures 
while remaining sensitive to its principal purposes of public accountability 
and avoidance of wasteful expenditures.”232 
 In addition to FACA, specific statutes govern the composition and 
duties of individual EPA advisory committees.233 For example, the Clean Air 
Scientific Advisory Committee must consist of “seven members including at 
least one member of the National Academy of Sciences, one physician, and 
one person representing State air pollution control agencies.”234 And by 
statute, the committee must review ambient air quality standards and advise 
the administrator on research for appraising the adequacy and basis of those 
standards.235 Failure to include a required type of panel member or to make 
required recommendations may give rise to an APA claim by would-be panel 
members of arbitrary and capricious agency action.  
C. Conflict of Interest Law 
 Conflict of interest concerns, a motivating factor behind FACA, are 
addressed directly by the federal statute governing conflicts of interest. 
Advisory committee members are considered “special government 
employees” who must comply with this criminal statute.236 
Only the government may prosecute individuals for violating the 
conflict of interest statute.237 However, private parties may assert claims 
under the APA that federal agencies have violated the statute. In Lorillard, 
                                                 
#231 @See Jacobs, supra note 207 (opining that as-applied challenges to the makeup of 
specific EPA advisory committees are “more likely to succeed” than facial challenges to 
EPA’s directive excluding grant recipients). 
#232 @Cargill, 173 F.3d at 342 (noting that a district court may bar use of a committee’s 
work product as a “last resort”); see also @Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Dept. 
of Interior, 26 F.3d 1103, 1107 (11th Cir. 1994) (affirming injunction barring use of 
advisory committee report prepared in violation of FACA). 
#233 @See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2012) (establishing Science Advisory Board); @7 
U.S.C. § 136w(d) (2012) (establishing Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Scientific Advisory Panel). 
#234 @42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
#235 @42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2)(B)–(C) (2012). 
#236 @18 U.S.C. § 208 (2012) (imposing penalties for acts affecting a personal financial 
interest); @18 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (defining “special government employee”); @see Joe 
G. Conley, Note, Conflict of Interest and the EPA’s Science Advisory Board, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 165, 168–69 (2007). 
#237 @See 18 U.S.C. § 216 (2012); @see e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 
1, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995); @Scherer v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1285 (D. Kan. 
2003). 
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Inc. v. FDA, for example, tobacco companies alleged the appointment of 
advisory committee members with conflicts of interest.238 The district court 
found standing based on allegations that the plaintiffs’ confidential 
information had been disclosed and that they had suffered injury to their right 
to fair decisionmaking.239 The court also deemed the alleged “creation and 
maintenance of an advisory committee tainted by conflicts of interest” to be 
judicially reviewable.240 
The conflict of interest statute prohibits federal employees, including 
special government employees, from “participat[ing] personally and 
substantially . . . through . . . recommendation, the rendering of advice, 
investigation, or otherwise” in a “particular matter” in which they have a 
financial interest.241 The prohibition applies if the particular matter will have 
a “direct and predictable effect” on that interest242—i.e., “matters that involve 
deliberation, decision, or action that is focused upon the interests of specific 
persons, or a discrete and identifiable class of persons.” Policymaking 
“directed to the interests of a large and diverse group of persons” lies outside 
this prohibition.243  
Even as to particular matters, various exceptions may allow an 
individual having a financial interest to serve on an advisory committee. For 
example, such an individual may participate after disclosing her financial 
interest and receiving a waiver finding that the interest is not likely to affect 
the integrity of the services provided or that the need for her services 
outweighs the potential conflict.244 Moreover, persons serving on advisory 
committees “may participate in any particular matter of general applicability 
where the disqualifying financial interest arises from his non-Federal 
employment . . . , provided that the matter will not have a special or distinct 
effect on the employee or employer other than as part of a class.”245  
Is EPA’s policy excluding grant recipients from advisory committees 
required by the conflict of interest statute? Under the regulations governing 
participation in particular matters of general applicability, grant recipients 
should be eligible to serve on advisory committees because their advice 
                                                 
#238 @Lorillard, Inc. v. U.S. Food and Drug Admin., 2012 WL 3542228, at *1 (D.D.C. 
2012).  
#239 @Id. at *2. 
#240 @Id. at *2. 
#241 @18 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2012). 
#242 @5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(a) (2019); @5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a)(1) (2019). 
#243 @5 C.F.R. § 2640.103(a)(1) (2019). 
#244 @18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1), (3) (2012); @5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(d)(3) (2019). The 
government official making the appointment must issue the waiver prior to committee 
service. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.301(a), 302(a). 
#245 @5 C.F.R. § 2640.203(g) (2019). 
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would have no more than a general or indirect effect on the universities they 
work for.246 Indeed, scientists who receive funding from companies subject 
to EPA regulations—whom EPA allows to serve on advisory committees—
would seem to be at least as conflicted as scientists who receive EPA 
funding.247 However, the conflict of interest statute merely prohibits 
participation when a conflict exists; it confers no right to participate on 
persons without a conflict. As a result, the statute offers no basis for 
challenging EPA’s directive. 
Does industry representative participation on advisory committees 
violate the conflict of interest statute? EPA use of advice from an industry-
dominated committee in setting a standard for that industry would seem 
problematic.248 Under Office of Government Ethics regulations, even the 
appearance of a lack of impartiality can be sufficient to bar participation 
where a particular matter is likely to have a direct and predictable effect on a 
member’s financial interests.249 Nevertheless, proving a violation may be 
difficult. A “direct and predictable effect” requires “a close causal link” and 
a “real, as opposed to a speculative possibility that the matter will affect the 
financial interest.”250 Demonstrated violations typically involve a 
government employee’s participation in discrete matters that directly 
impacted the employee’s finances.251 In the wake of an alleged conflict 
involving an advisory committee member, EPA might contest the causal links 
between the committee’s advice and the member’s finances. Specifically, the 
government might contend that the committee’s advice did not bind the 
agency in its rulemaking, that EPA’s chosen regulatory standard did not 
affect the member’s company, and that any effect on the company did not 
directly impact the member’s finances. 
                                                 
#246 @See Michael Burger, Scott Pruitt’s Attack on Scientists Serving on EPA Advisory 
Boards is Illegal, CLIMATE LAW BLOG (Nov. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/9ERR-FWZ3. Cf. 
@Grassetti v. Weinberger, 408 F. Supp. 142, 152 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (rejecting grant 
applicant’s argument that grant recipients’ participation in application decision constituted 
conflict of interest, as argument “that their denial to him would leave more money in the 
pot for future proposals from themselves” presented “too remote” a possible conflict of 
interest). 
#247 @See Burger, supra note 246. 
#248 @See id.  
#249 @5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a). An employee may receive a waiver allowing participation if 
the government’s interest in the employee’s participation outweighs the concern regarding 
the appearance of lack of impartiality. @Id. at § 2635.502(d). 
#250 @5 C.F.R. § 2635.402(b). 
#251 @See, e.g., United States. v. White Eagle, 721 F.3d 1108, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(recounting cases and reversing conviction where defendant allegedly concealed 
subordinate employee’s fraudulent operation of government loan program in order to 
ensure that program would continue and defendant would keep her own job). 
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Ultimately, absent evidence of a direct link between a committee 
member’s conduct and her financial interests, the conflict of interest statute 
appears to be a relatively unpromising means of addressing controversial 
appointments. 
D. Scientific Integrity Policies 
 Most, if not all, aspects of the war on regulatory science raise 
concerns of scientific integrity. Broadly speaking, scientific integrity refers 
to adherence to professional values and practices when conducting science 
and applying its results.252 Under President Obama, EPA and other federal 
agencies adopted scientific integrity policies to govern their scientific 
activities and use of scientific information.253 These sometimes far-reaching 
policies underscore agencies’ commitments to scientific integrity. 
Ultimately, however, they do not give rise to legally enforceable constraints. 
 The following discussion focuses on EPA’s scientific integrity policy, 
which seeks to “[e]nsure that the Agency’s scientific work is of the highest 
quality [and] free from political interference or personal motivations.”254 
Issued in 2012, the policy applies to all agency personnel, scientists and 
political appointees alike, when engaging in or supervising scientific 
activities, communicating information about scientific activities, and 
utilizing scientific information in making policy decisions.255 The policy 
provides for a Scientific Integrity Committee, chaired by the agency’s 
Scientific Integrity Official, to oversee its implementation.256  
EPA’s scientific integrity policy focuses on four areas—agency 
culture, public communications, peer review and advisory committees, and 
professional development.257 To promote a culture of scientific integrity, the 
policy prohibits employees from “impeding the timely release of scientific 
findings and conclusions,” bars agency leadership “from intimidating or 
coercing scientists to alter scientific data, findings, or professional opinions 
or inappropriately influencing scientific advisory boards,” and advises that 
candidates for scientific positions be selected primarily on their scientific 
qualifications.258 In public communications, the agency should “ensur[e] that 
                                                 
#252 @See Basic Information About Scientific Integrity, EPA, https://perma.cc/N5UV-
9FBS. 
#253@Memorandum on Scientific Integrity, 2009 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 137 (Mar. 9, 
2009), https://perma.cc/A98X-FNBG; @Kei Koizumi & Jerry Sheehan, Scientific Integrity 
Policies: An Update, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY (Dec. 19, 2016, 1:41 
PM), https://perma.cc/T9YN-LGE3. 
#254 @EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY POLICY 3 (2012), https://perma.cc/ZKR3-DV75. 
#255 @Id. at 2. 
#256 @Id. at 3. 
#257 @Id. 
#258 @Id. at 4–5. 
45 
 
scientific research and results are presented openly and with integrity.”259 
Selection of advisory committee members “should be based on expertise . . ., 
balance of the scientific or technical points of view represented by the 
members, and the consideration of conflicts of interest.”260 And with respect 
to professional development, the policy encourages government scientists to 
present their work at scientific meetings and participate actively in 
professional societies.261 
Various EPA actions appear to violate core elements of this policy, if 
not its spirit. Blocking agency scientists from presenting their findings at a 
conference conflicts with the policy’s professional development provisions. 
Ordering or pressuring employees to avoid mentioning climate change seems 
to run afoul of the policy’s provisions regarding public communications. 
Appointing advisory committee members who lack scientific qualifications 
or who have close industry connections runs counter to a culture of scientific 
integrity. And the secret science rule, while purporting to promote 
transparency, would undermine the integrity of the policymaking process.  
Notwithstanding the existence of scientific integrity policies, political 
interference with science seems commonplace at EPA and perhaps other 
agencies as well. Unfortunately, legal options for redressing violations of 
such policies are limited. EPA’s policy expressly states that it offers internal 
guidance and creates no enforceable obligations.262 The agency’s Scientific 
Integrity Official and Scientific Integrity Review Panel may investigate 
potential violations, however.263 EPA’s inspector general also may look into 
instances of research misconduct, including “fabrication, falsification or 
plagiarism” in performing research or “ordering, advising, or suggesting that 
subordinates engage in such misconduct.”264  
Within the limited available procedures, establishing a violation of 
EPA’s scientific integrity policy may not be easy. An investigation of 
remarks by then-Administrator Pruitt illustrates potential difficulties in 
enforcing the policy. In response to a question regarding whether “it’s been 
                                                 
#259 @Id. at 5. 
#260 @Id. at 9. 
#261 @Id. 
#262 @Id. at 2. 
#263 @Id. at 10; EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY PROGRAM, DETERMINATION REGARDING 
ALLEGATIONS OF A LOSS OF SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY CONCERNING REMARKS BY 
ADMINISTRATOR PRUITT 1 (2017), https://perma.cc/F7H3-P4XZ. 
#264 @EPA, POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR ADDRESSING RESEARCH MISCONDUCT 1 
(2003), https://perma.cc/H7LK-QKL4; @see EPA, OFFICE OF THE SCIENCE ADVISOR, 
COORDINATION PROCEDURES BETWEEN THE SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY OFFICIAL AND THE 
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL REGARDING RESEARCH MISCONDUCT ALLEGATIONS 
(2015), https://perma.cc/6K3B-SK8V. 
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proven that carbon dioxide is the primary control knob for climate,” Pruitt 
replied, “No. I think that measuring with precision human activity on the 
climate is something very challenging to do . . . . So no, I would not agree 
that it’s a primary contributor to the global warming that we see.” 265 On its 
face, the statement appears to misrepresent scientific conclusions regarding 
climate change and to exaggerate the uncertainty associated with it. EPA’s 
Scientific Integrity Review Panel nonetheless characterized the statement as 
an opinion and noted that it was not made in a decisional context.266 Thus, 
the panel concluded, the statement fell squarely within the scientific integrity 
policy’s protections for free expression of opinions by EPA employees.267  
While the panel may have properly applied the policy to Pruitt’s 
remarks, the decision reflects some of the policy’s limits. Scientifically 
questionable statements often may be characterized as opinions and thus, 
under the panel’s rationale, lie beyond the policy’s scope. The panel also 
seemed to limit the reach of the policy outside of decisional contexts. And 
although the agency may administer corrective discipline, such discipline 
focuses on instances of blatant scientific misconduct—“fabrication, 
plagiarism, misrepresentation,” and the like.268 
Allegations of research misconduct are subject to anti-fraud statutes 
and research misconduct policies as well as scientific integrity policies. Each 
federal agency has an inspector general charged with investigating and 
reporting on fraud, waste, and violations of law within the agency.269 
Appointed by the President with Senate consent and supervised by agency 
heads, inspectors general report results of investigations to agency heads and 
to Congress.270 EPA’s inspector general is also authorized to investigate and 
report on allegations of research misconduct271—including interference with 
the work of agency scientists or ordering or suggesting that subordinates 
engage in research misconduct.272   
                                                 
#265 @EPA, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY PROGRAM, supra note 263, at 2. 
#266 @Id. at 4. 
#267 @Id. at 4. Although Pruitt’s statement was left unsanctioned, a Freedom of 
Information Act lawsuit resulted in an order requiring EPA to turn over the evidentiary 
basis for Pruitt’s claims. @See Scott Waldman, Judge to EPA: Show Your Science, 
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#270 @Id. §§ 3(a) (2008), 4(a)(5) (2016), 5 (2018). 
#271 @EPA, POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR ADDRESSING RESEARCH MISCONDUCT, supra 
note 264, at 3 (2003), https://perma.cc/H7LK-QKL4. 
#272 @Id. at 2 (defining research misconduct). However, aside from criminal matters, 
which are referred to the Department of Justice, any investigations of the agency head 
could itself give rise to a conflict of interest because the inspector general would be 
investigating “the one individual to whom the Act makes him responsible on a day-to-day 
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E. First Amendment and Whistleblower Protections 
 Finally, government efforts to restrict the speech of its employees 
raise potential First Amendment concerns. If government scientists suffer 
adverse employment actions for the research they undertake or for the 
research results they produce, whistleblower protections may be relevant as 
well.   
1. First Amendment 
The First Amendment does not restrict the government’s own speech, 
even if misguided or erroneous.273 Thus, the First Amendment does not 
prevent government agencies from publishing inaccurate or even false 
statements about climate change. Moreover, “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as 
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate 
their communications from employer discipline.”274 Accordingly, the First 
Amendment does not prohibit EPA from restricting its employees from 
discussing climate change at conferences pursuant to their official duties.  
The First Amendment does place some limits on the government’s 
ability to censor the speech of its employees, however. When a public 
employee “speaks as a citizen addressing a matter of public concern,” the 
government employer may impose “only those speech restrictions that are 
necessary . . . to operate efficiently and effectively.”275 Two Supreme Court 
decisions illustrate the distinction between speaking as a public employee and 
speaking as a citizen. Garcetti v. Ceballos held that First Amendment 
protections did not apply to a deputy district attorney’s memorandum 
recommending dismissal of a pending case.276 In contrast, Pickering v. Board 
of Education found a teacher’s letter to a local newspaper regarding the local 
school board’s funding policies to be protected speech.277 The letter, unlike 
the Garcetti memorandum, “had no official significance and bore similarities 
to letters submitted by numerous citizens every day.”278  
                                                 
basis.” @Dan W. Reicher, Note, Conflicts of Interest in Inspector General, Justice 
Department, and Special Prosecutor Investigations of Agency Heads, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
975, 986–87 (1983) (discussing potential conflicts inherent in 1982 inspector general 
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#273 @Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech 
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#274 @Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
#275 @Id. at 419, 423. 
#276 @Id. at 413–14, 421–22. 
#277 @391 U.S. 563, 565–66 (1968). 
#278 @Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422. 
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   Whether an employee is speaking as part of their official duties or as 
a citizen may not be obvious. Neither the location of the speech, nor its 
subject matter, nor the fact that the employee learned of the speech’s subject 
matter through her employment, is dispositive.279 The critical issue is whether 
the speech was made pursuant to the employee’s duties, a practical inquiry 
that looks beyond the employee’s formal job description.280 Factors relevant 
to the inquiry include the employee’s job responsibilities, the nature and 
subject matter of the speech, whether the communication was made outside 
the chain of command, and how and to whom the message was 
communicated.281 If a public employee is speaking as a citizen, the Pickering 
test balances the employee’s interest “in commenting upon matters of public 
concern” against the government’s interest “as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”282  
How might First Amendment protections apply to speech by 
government employees on climate change? Climate change is indisputably a 
“matter of political, social or other concern to the community” and a “subject 
of legitimate news interest.”283 Whether an employee is speaking as a citizen 
or pursuant to official duties may present a difficult question, however. For 
example, suppose that the EPA employees at the Narragansett Bay 
                                                 
#279 @See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 239-40 (2014); @Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420–21. 
#280 @See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21, 424–25. 
#281 @See Ross v. Breslin, 693 F.3d 300, 305–306 (2d Cir. 2012); Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 
735 F.3d 1060, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); see also @Andrew v. Clark, 561 F.3d 261, 267 
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#283 @Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); @Lane, 573 U.S. at 241. See generally 
Rodney A. Smolla, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 18:10 (2018) (noting 
that courts are more likely to find that employee comments on internal workplace matters, 
“ranging from anything to office gossip and chit-chat to the affairs and operations of a 
particular agency or office,” are less likely to be deemed matters of public concern than 
comments on “matters outside the issues of their workplace”). 
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conference had participated in their personal capacity, taking personal leave 
in order to attend, identifying themselves only as private citizens, and making 
clear that their remarks represented their personal views. Or suppose that 
EPA employees, after being ordered by their supervisors not to report their 
findings of climate change’s impacts, privately contacted the media to 
distribute those findings.  
The employee speech in each instance likely would qualify as citizen 
speech. That the employees may have derived their data and findings from 
their employment would not be dispositive. “The critical question . . . is 
whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an 
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties.”284 
Employees who express their personal views on their own time at a 
conference or in a letter to the editor are acting as ordinary citizens. 
Moreover, if an employee speaks in contravention of a supervisor’s orders 
not to discuss a particular subject, such defiance suggests that the speech in 
question lies outside of the employee’s professional duties.285 
Assuming that the elements of public concern and speaking as a 
citizen are satisfied, courts apply the Pickering balancing test to determine 
whether the injury to the government caused by the speech outweighs the 
employee’s interest in free expression.286 A government order limiting 
employee speech on climate change would not fare well under this test. The 
government interests typically asserted in favor of speech restrictions—
ensuring operational efficiency or maintaining discipline and respect among 
co-workers287—are unlikely to be present when employees speak out on 
climate change. Merely preventing employees from speaking in a manner 
contrary to the government’s position on climate change does not appear to 
be the sort of interest that would outweigh an employee’s free speech 
interests.288 Indeed, the fact that climate change is a matter of great public 
                                                 
#284 @Lane, 573 U.S. at 240. 
#285 @See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1075 (“Indeed, the fact that an employee is threatened or 
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concern demands an especially strong showing by the government of harm to 
its interests.289 
2. Whistleblower Protections 
Adverse actions against government employees for speaking out 
could implicate not only the First Amendment but also whistleblower 
protections. Reporting environmental risk data, disclosing efforts to suppress 
research, or revealing politically motivated tinkering with research results all 
could qualify as protected activity. 
The Whistleblower Protection Act prohibits adverse personnel action 
against a government employee for disclosing information that the employee 
reasonably believes to demonstrate a violation of any law or regulation or 
“gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.”290 A 2012 statutory 
amendment specifically protects disclosures that reveal “censorship related 
to research, analysis or technical information”—a term defined as “any effort 
to distort, misrepresent, or suppress research, analysis or technical 
information.”291 The amendment thus extends whistleblower protections to 
government scientists who make disclosures in defense of scientific 
integrity.292 At the same time, protected activity under the statute does not 
include policy disagreements or general criticism of an agency.293 
In addition to the Whistleblower Protection Act, several 
environmental statutes prohibit public or private employers from retaliating 
against employees who institute, assist, or otherwise participate in the 
                                                 
the interests of the State in litigation or otherwise, is antithetical to the protection extended 
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2d Sess. 8 (1978) that “only disclosures of public health or safety dangers” are protected, 
not “general criticisms by an employee . . . that the agency is not doing enough to protect 
the environment”). 
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administration or enforcement of those statutes.294 To establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation, an employee must show that her employer is covered by 
the act, that she engaged in protected activity, and that she suffered adverse 
employment action as a result.295 The employer may rebut this showing by 
producing evidence of a legitimate reason for the adverse action, which shifts 
the burden to the employee to show that the protected activity was the reason 
for the discharge.296 
The various whistleblower statutes protect a broad range of 
government scientist activities. However, merely engaging in disfavored 
research is not a protected activity.297 Nor is it enough for an employee’s 
research to demonstrate harm to human health or the environment.298 Rather, 
the employee must engage in whistleblowing—for example, by 
disseminating his or her concerns to the media—and must prove that adverse 
personnel action was taken as a result.299 In addition, under the environmental 
whistleblowing statutes, the employee’s actions must contribute to “a 
proceeding for the administration or enforcement” of the requirements of the 
relevant environmental statute.300 Examples of protected activities include: 
(1) “criticizing a draft report, concerning toxicology and carcinogenesis 
studies, which EPA contemplated using in regulating fluoride levels;”301 (2) 
complaining to Congress about EPA’s failure to disclose and address toxic 
exposures and its attempts to misrepresent a study establishing that a 
pesticide was carcinogenic;302 (3) providing an affidavit to a public interest 
group supporting a causal relationship between dioxin and human health 
                                                 
#294 @Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (1986); @Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1972); @Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1977); @Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (1994); @Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 6971(a) (1980); @Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9610(a) (1980). 
#295 @See Emily Becker, Calling Foul: Deficiencies in Approaches to Environmental 
Whistleblowers and Suggested Reforms, 6 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & THE ENV’T 
63, 86 (2014). 
#296 @See In re Marcus v. EPA, No. 92-TSC-5, 1994 WL 897260, at *3 (DOL Off. Adm. 
App., Feb. 7, 1994) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 416 (1993)). 
#297 @See Robert R. Kuehn, Suppression of Environmental Science, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 
333, 357 (2004). 
#298 @See id. [Kuehn] at 358. 
#299 @5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (2017); see Kuehn, supra note 297, at 355, 358.  
#300 @See also Kuehn, supra note 297, at 357. 
#301 @In re Marcus v. EPA, No. 92-TSC-5, 1994 WL 897260, at *3 (DOL Off. Adm. App., 
Feb. 7, 1994). 
#302 @In re Jenkins, No. 92-CAA-6, 1994 WL 897221, at *5 (DOL Off. Adm. App., May 
18, 1994) (noting that parties had stipulated that such actions constituted protected 
activity). 
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effects, contrary to statements made by EPA’s administrator;303 and (4) 
expressing concerns about the safety of sludge fertilization in writings, 
speeches, and testimony.304 
 A number of incidents under the Trump Administration have 
triggered whistleblower concerns. The Interior Department’s reassignment of 
top career officials, including Joel Clement, triggered a whistleblower 
complaint and departmental and congressional inquiries.305 In addition, gag 
orders issued at the start of the Trump Administration ran afoul of 
Whistleblower Protection Act provisions governing agency nondisclosure 
policies.306 The orders demanded that employees inform the agency before 
communicating with Congress and forbade employees from making public 
statements, but failed to include a required disclaimer affirming employees’ 
whistleblower rights and protections.307 
Ultimately, whistleblower provisions offer some protections to 
government scientists but are subject to important limitations. First, these 
provisions are defensive: they protect employees from adverse employment 
actions but require employees to put their employment status at risk. Second, 
pursuing a whistleblowing claim is not easy. Complainants’ historical success 
rate in obtaining administrative remedies has been low.308 Third, the 
environmental whistleblower statutes establish short timeframes for seeking 
relief, requiring that a claim be filed within thirty days of an adverse action.309 
IV. Sizing Up the War on Regulatory Science 
 One can easily get lost in the frequent skirmishes, multiple fronts, and 
wide range of legal doctrines that characterize the war on regulatory science. 
                                                 
#303 @Id. at *6. 
#304 @In re Lewis v. EPA, No. 04-117, 2007 WL 1031361 (DOL Adm. Rev. Bd. Mar. 30, 
2007). 
#305 @See supra text accompanying notes 137-139; @Michael Doyle, IG Looking into Why 
Senior Staffers Were Moved, GREENWIRE (Sept. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/R2RF-762N. 
#306 @See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13) (2012); @Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 115. 
#307 @See Pamela Wolf, Republican Lawmakers Warn HHS Secretary That Memo May 
Violate Whistleblower Protections, WK WORKDAY BLOG (May 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/Q4W9-PG87; @Testimony of Thomas Devine, Government 
Accountability Project, Sept. 9, 2017, at 14–15, https://perma.cc/Y58D-CWJC; @Letter 
from Rep. Elijah E. Cummings & Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr. to Donald F. McGahn, II, Jan. 26, 
2017, https://perma.cc/A45S-YAGR. 
#308 @See Devine, supra note 307, at 8–13. 
#309 @See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1) (2012); @33 U.S.C. § 1367(b)(1) (2012). By 
contrast, the Whistleblower Protection Act contains no statute of limitations for filing a 
complaint with the Office of Special Counsel. @See Thomas M. Devine, The 
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation for the Modern Law of Employment 
Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 542 (1999). 
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This Part steps back from the minutiae and assesses the war’s broader 
ramifications. External administrative law, enforced through judicial 
oversight, provides only a partial constraint. Measures internal to the 
executive branch are also important—but of limited effect. Beyond the 
immediate legal concerns, the war on regulatory science has long-term 
implications for the relationship between law and science and for the practice 
of regulatory science within the federal government. 
A. The Limited Reach of External Administrative Law 
As just discussed, numerous laws are relevant to the war on regulatory 
science. The APA is perhaps the most important bulwark against agency 
decisions based on inadequate or flawed science. Judicial review under the 
APA is critical in ensuring that agencies follow appropriate procedures and 
support their rules with reasoned decisionmaking. However, because APA 
review is limited to final agency action, “litigants may obtain review only of 
particular discrete actions of agencies, rather than the internal programs and 
structures that brought about those actions.”310 Indeed, a brief re-examination 
of the Trump Administration’s actions reveals that many aspects of the war 
on regulatory science are governed only loosely by law or may escape judicial 
review completely.  
First, EPA’s secret science rule may initially sidestep a direct legal 
challenge. The rule is likely to encounter judicial review once it is applied in 
subsequent rulemakings, but perhaps only on a case-by-case basis.311 
Regardless of whether those subsequent rules are upheld, the secret science 
rule in the meantime will drain agency resources as scientists and agency staff 
track down data and redact personal information.312  
A red-team, blue-team debate on climate change or National Security 
Council reassessment of climate science could prove nonjusticiable. Because 
such a debate or reassessment may not determine “rights or obligations . . . 
from which legal consequences will flow,” courts may conclude that it does 
not constitute reviewable final agency action.313 This is not to say that such a 
debate or reassessment would have no impact. Either could sow unwarranted 
doubts on climate change and serve as a foundation for deregulating GHG 
emissions. 
                                                 
#310 @Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. 
REV. 1239, 1264 (2017). 
#311 @See supra Part III.A.3.a. 
#312 @See Scott Waldman & Robin Bravender, Pruitt Is Expected to Restrict Science. 
Here’s What It Means, E&E NEWS (Mar. 16, 2018), https://perma.cc/9WB2-SLWC. 
#313 @Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997); @see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) 
(authorizing judicial review of final agency action); @Metzger & Stack, supra note 310, at 
1264. 
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Advisory committee appointments and other executive branch 
appointments also may avoid judicial review. Domination of advisory 
committees by industry representatives may not give rise to justiciable 
claims. Even if courts reach the substantive merits, FACA and conflict of 
interest rules offer only a modest check on agencies’ broad discretion over 
committee appointments and operations. As for the appointment of executive 
officials, Congress has a greater role than the courts in ensuring such officials 
possess the requisite qualifications, but neither can do much to compel the 
executive to make appointments when the chief executive declines to do so.  
Finally, adverse personnel actions and direct censorship of agency 
scientists may give rise to whistleblower and First Amendment claims. 
However, these claims are not easy to pursue. Furthermore, existing law 
provides little safeguard for the integrity of agency speech. Scientific 
integrity policies do speak to such concerns, but enforcement of these policies 
is left largely to each agency. 
Elements of the war on regulatory science that escape judicial review 
could have serious implications beyond the Trump presidency. EPA’s secret 
science rule may discourage potential research subjects from participating in 
health studies—many of which span years or even decades—for fear that 
their personal information will be disclosed.314 More generally, a failure to 
collect health and environmental data could leave significant gaps in the 
knowledge base for future policymaking. Personnel decisions driven by 
hostility to scientific findings may undermine civil service protections and 
discourage scientists from serving as government employees or advisory 
committee members. And a lack of scientific integrity in what agencies say 
and do under the Trump Administration could undermine agencies’ 
credibility with courts, Congress, and the general public even under 
subsequent administrations. Just as an agency’s reputation for strong 
procedures, capabilities, and substantive programs can earn greater deference 
from judges and legislators as well as support from nongovernmental actors 
and the public, a reputation to the contrary can undermine an agency’s 
authority and effectiveness.315 
                                                 
314 @See Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Pruitt Unveils Controversial “Transparency” 
Rule Limiting What Research EPA Can Use, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2018 (reporting 
concerns of former EPA administrator Gina McCarthy). [TE: Perma?] 
#315 @See William E. Kovacic, Creating a Respected Brand: How Regulatory Agencies 
Signal Quality, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 238–41 (2015). 
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B. The Importance of Internal Administrative Law 
The foregoing discussion offers an important reminder that “[s]o 
much of administrative law happens without courts.”316 Describing this 
universe of “internal administrative law,” Gillian Metzger and Kevin Stack 
point to “measures governing agency functioning that are created within the 
agency or the executive branch and that speak primarily to government 
personnel.”317 Indeed, much of the war on regulatory science implicates 
internal administrative law governing the composition and use of scientific 
advisory committees, assignment of agency personnel, statements by 
agencies or agency employees, and the like.  
External administrative law is insufficient to constrain agencies, 
Metzger and Stack explain, because “the vast majority of agency actions and 
decisions, including those that lead to the adoption of a particular rule or 
policy, will never be subject to review.”318 Judicial review requires final 
agency action and a justiciable claim, as well as a plaintiff with the will and 
resources to pursue litigation.319 Expanding judicial review by tightening 
standards of judicial scrutiny or reducing barriers to litigation would not 
necessarily be desirable, however, lest such measures leave administrative 
agencies unable to act.320 In any instance, judicial review usually operates 
after the fact, when the damage may already be done.321 
One possible response to the insufficiency of external administrative 
law is to strengthen institutional checks other than the courts, such as 
inspector general offices, internal “offices of goodness,” and civil service 
protections.322 Similarly, Metzger and Stack urge the executive branch to 
                                                 
#316 @Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law Without Courts, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1620, 
1624 (2018). 
#317 @Metzger & Stack, supra note 310, at 1251. 
#318 @Id. at 1264; @see Robert L. Glicksman & Emily Hammond, Agency Behavior and 
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#319 @See Metzger & Stack, supra note 310, at 1264. 
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#321 @See Metzger & Stack, supra note 310, at 1264. 
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on agency discretion”); @Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without 
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establish internal administrative law that reflects “rule-of-law values 
including transparency, argumentation, and consistency.”323 While such 
approaches seem generally desirable, their success depends on the good faith 
of executive branch actors and the willingness of Congress and the public to 
push back when norms of administrative legality are ignored.324 Congress has 
the power to supervise agencies through agency appropriations, oversight 
hearings, confirmation votes, and legislation.325 And the public can register 
its views at the ballot box, in formal comment processes, and through public 
protests and social media.  
C. Eroding Agency Norms with Respect to Science 
The fact that much agency action lies outside the reach of the courts 
points to the importance of not only internal administrative law, but also 
agency norms. Norms are more than behavioral regularities; they are informal 
rules that provide reasons for compliance and establish standards for 
evaluating an actor’s behavior.326 Norms are enforced and reinforced through 
electoral politics, public pressure, and institutional actors such as Congress, 
the bureaucracy, and the media.327 But norms can dissolve if they are 
disregarded and if political forces or the public fail to reinforce them.328 
                                                 
values that may differ from the agency’s primary goals); @Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, 
Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 540–41 (2015) (discussing role 
of civil service as a counterweight to unilateral and potentially abusive exercises of 
authority by agency leaders). 
#323 @Metzger & Stack, supra note 310, at 1297. 
#324 @See Walker, supra note 316, at 1639–40 (“Administrative law must look beyond 
courts for additional safeguards. Congress, for example, could better use its oversight 
powers to rein in instances of administrative law without courts. . . . The President could no 
doubt also play a meaningful role.”); cf. Metzger & Stack, supra note 310, at 1301 (noting 
that a new presidential administration that changes substantive direction without heeding 
internal constraints and values of transparency, reasoned justification, and consistency may 
achieve faster policy change “but at the cost of an opportunity to embed norms of 
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#325 @See HOLLY DOREMUS ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, 
AND READINGS 105 (6th ed. 2012). 
#326 @See Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2188, 
2196–98 (2018). @See also Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and 
Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350 (1997) (contending that norms “are 
enforced by some means other than legal sanctions”). 
#327 @See Renan, supra note 326, at 2198, 2204 (discussing enforcement of presidential 
norms); cf. Jessica M. Nolan, Social Norms and Their Enforcement, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL INFLUENCE (Stephen G. Harkins et al., eds. 2017), at 3 (describing 
social norms as rules “that guide morally relevant social behavior by way of social 
sanctions, instead of the force of laws”). 
#328 @Cf. Renan, supra note 326, at 2191 (suggesting that presidential norms break down 
“when the extralegal system ceases to enforce them”).  
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Various norms govern how agencies handle science and scientific experts: 
agencies should allow experts to discuss their work; agencies should base 
their decisions on scientific evidence; political officials should not direct 
agencies’ scientific findings; and agencies should not stack scientific 
advisory boards with political appointees.329  
1. Undermining the Role of Scientific Authority in Rulemaking 
A number of the Trump Administration’s actions could undermine 
the role of scientific authority in the rulemaking process. Science’s role is 
vulnerable because agency policy and custom, as well as law, define that role. 
The establishment and operation of scientific advisory committees illustrates 
the combined influence of law and norms. As discussed above, FACA 
governs the hundreds of scientific and technical advisory committees that 
assess scientific research and offer policy recommendations.330 Yet agencies 
retain broad discretion in matters such as how often a committee meets, how 
they use a committee’s advice, and whether committee members may expect 
their terms to be renewed. Until recently, past practice has strongly 
influenced agencies’ exercise of that discretion. 
The Trump Administration has departed repeatedly from historical 
norms in using and managing science advisory committees, with each 
departure in the direction of lessening scientific input. Various committees 
have been disbanded or fallen into disuse, and EPA’s policy barring grant 
recipients from advisory committees, along with its unprecedented 
nonrenewal of certain committee members, has dramatically shifted the 
composition of these committees in industry’s favor.331 These moves reflect 
a view that the provision of scientific advice is just another target for political 
maneuvering rather than a source of objective expertise. The politicization of 
scientific advice is not novel, but its extent, and the particular techniques 
used, are unprecedented. 
One might argue that the present politicization of advisory 
committees is of fleeting significance. A subsequent administration could 
reconstitute committees that have been disbanded and repopulate advisory 
committees with well-respected and open-minded experts from diverse 
backgrounds. However, the damage from disregarding norms against 
politicization may be lasting. An advisory committee’s credibility may suffer 
                                                 
#329 @See Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise 
with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2029–30 (2015) (discussing examples 
of norms the violation of which have historically triggered outrage and bipartisan 
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#330 @See supra Part III.B; see also CSD, supra note 103, at 3. 
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long-term damage if it is perceived as a politicized body.332 Recruitment of 
qualified candidates may be difficult if committee service seems subject to 
political whims.333 And future administrations may consider themselves less 
constrained by norms against politicization. 
Nor are such concerns alleviated by the fact that these committees are 
merely advisory. Granted, advisory committees have neither the ability nor 
the authority to decide policy questions. However, regulatory agencies need 
impartial scientific knowledge in order to make well-informed policy 
decisions. Advisory committees—if unbiased and free of conflicts—are an 
important mechanism for providing such knowledge.334 In addition to 
informing present agency decisions, advisory committees also help to set 
research priorities. In doing so, they play a critical role in identifying health 
and environmental concerns, aligning the goals of regulatory science with 
those of research science, and building up an agency’s reputation and 
expertise.335  
Politicization of regulatory science and scientific advisory 
committees undermines the scientific basis and political legitimacy of 
government policies.336 Politicized advisory committees facilitate agency 
capture, rather than providing a bulwark against improper influence. 
Likewise, censorship of agency scientists reduces transparency and deprives 
the agencies, courts, and public of critical information.337 Resulting agency 
decisions are likely to be poorly informed, ineffective, or even harmful.338 In 
                                                 
#332 @See JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 244 (explaining that authority of advisory 
committees derives in part from fact that work is perceived as scientific); @cf. Doremus, 
supra note 4, at 1619 (discussing danger of politicized scientific debate undermining the 
role of science).  
#333 @Cf. Walters, supra note 219, at 693 (suggesting that proceduralization of advisory 
committee membership requirements may deter qualified potential members from serving). 
#334 @Cf. Greer & Steinzor, supra note 20, at 37–38 (discussing danger of EPA’s Science 
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#335 @See JASANOFF, supra note 21, at 237. 
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results undermines courts’ ability to review agency actions).  
338 @See Gilman, supra note 143, at 588 (explaining that the Bush administration’s efforts 
to distort and suppress scientific findings caused harm “by making bad policy, 
demoralizing government scientists, and misinforming the public about important issues.”). 
[AU: Not sure that this second part of the footnote discussing Mass. v. EPA is relevant 
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some instances, agency employees may engage in bureaucratic resistance by 
whistleblowing, insisting on adherence to norms, or otherwise resisting 
superiors’ directives.339 However, such measures may not be effective and 
can come at a high personal cost.340 Over the long term, scientists may 
hesitate to work in an environment subject to politicization, and public 
confidence in the work of government agencies may erode.341  
2. Ignoring Science as a Basis for Law and Policy 
Relatedly, many aspects of the war on regulatory science reflect an 
unprecedented rejection of science as a basis for law and policy. In contrast 
to its predecessors, the Trump Administration has pursued its deregulatory 
agenda by crippling, ignoring, or suppressing regulatory science. Its violation 
of norms regarding the use of science in reasoned decisionmaking indeed 
pose a threat to the modern administrative state. 
Although prior administrations sometimes exploited the gap between 
what science can do and what people expect it to do, they generally continued 
to express a high regard for science. For example, the George W. Bush 
Administration was criticized for “manipulat[ing] the scientific process and 
distort[ing] or suppress[ing] scientific findings.”342 In climate change and 
other areas, that Administration repeatedly pointed to scientific uncertainty 
as a reason not to regulate.343 Yet the Bush Administration also touted 
scientific inquiry and proclaimed adherence to the highest scientific 
standards. The Bush White House proposed that agencies apply rigorous peer 
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342 House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, supra note 4, at I; see also Shapiro, 
supra note 35, at 31–32 (discussing political interference with science under Bush 
administration). Disregard of agency scientists is not the sole province of Republicans; 
President Obama occasionally “ran roughshod over the views of agencies’ scientific 
experts.” Farber, supra note 122, at 4. 
#343 @See Doremus, supra note 9, at 256–57, 266–74. The Bush administration applied this 
approach to climate change as well as to various decisions not to list species as endangered. 
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review to all significant regulatory information (although the proposal was 
seen by some as an effort to hamstring agencies).344 President Bush appointed 
in a timely fashion a chief science adviser, who underscored “the President’s 
policy of strongly supporting science and applying the highest scientific 
standards in decision making.”345 And as that adviser noted, federal research 
and development budgets increased significantly under President Bush.346 
The Bush Administration may have concealed political decisions “behind a 
cloak of science,” but it did not question the importance of science in making 
and implementing environmental policy.347 
The Trump Administration, in contrast, has systematically expressed 
disdain for regulatory science.348 The president long delayed appointing a 
presidential science advisor, has chosen non-scientists to head agencies that 
deal with science-related matters, and signed a budget authorizing increased 
research funding only after first proposing stark funding reductions.349 The 
Administration’s suppression of speech and inquiry on climate change 
reflects a rejection not only of scientific findings but also of norms regarding 
transparency and rational agency decisionmaking.350 Finally, EPA’s secret 
science rule, while purporting to adhere to norms of transparency and 
objectivity, actually redefines acceptable regulatory science in a manner 
inconsistent with scientific standards of validity.351 
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Republicans Won., NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 5, 2018, 
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It would be naïve to suggest that regulatory science is free of politics. 
Regulatory science blends science and policy, and agencies—the 
practitioners of regulatory science—are subject to political demands from 
Congress, the president, and the public. Nevertheless, agencies are supposed 
to exercise their expertise and engage in rational decisionmaking; they are 
not supposed to make purely political decisions.352 Prior administrations have 
operated on the assumption that science is foundational to rational policy 
making with good reason: an agency that acts without accounting for relevant 
scientific data is practically inviting courts to invalidate such action.353 But 
agencies take account of scientific data for an additional reason: reasoned 
decisionmaking is a norm that agencies have internalized.354 Adherence to 
this norm helps to legitimize their decisions, regardless of the possibility of 
judicial review.355 
 Courts do serve as a critical safeguard of reasoned decisionmaking 
when agency actions ignore relevant science. However, when an agency fails 
to act in the face of data that calls for action, judicial review is far less 
likely.356 Doctrinal hurdles of standing and nonreviewability often bar courts 
from reviewing agency inaction.357 In addition, the judicial review that may 
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occur after a rulemaking petition is denied rarely results in an order to 
promulgate specific rules.358 Thus, where inaction is at issue, the norm of 
reasoned decisionmaking serves as an essential mechanism for prompting an 
agency to respond to the science. When that norm is flouted—i.e., when an 
agency fails to respond to clear threats despite having the authority, mandate, 
and resources to do so—political and public pressure to adhere to the norm 
may be the only viable response. 
D. Collateral Effects on Research Science 
Finally, the Trump Administration’s actions have the potential to 
exacerbate the erosion of societal norms, not just agency norms, regarding 
science. Although the Trump Administration’s actions are better described as 
a war on regulatory science than as a war on research science, harm to 
research science may result as scientists avoid particular lines of inquiry or 
are dragged into political advocacy. Moreover, the Administration’s war on 
regulatory science is occurring against a backdrop of developments that are 
more broadly weakening scientific authority and influence in society. 
The Administration’s attacks on regulatory science, including the 
proposed slashing of scientific research budgets, have prompted political 
activism by some scientists. The April 2017 March for Science, for example, 
attracted an estimated one million people to rallies in hundreds of locations 
worldwide.359 While public advocacy by scientists is not inherently 
problematic, partisan activity by scientists risks the credibility of the 
scientific community.360 If scientists are perceived as partisan actors, society 
may view their research findings as politically motivated arguments rather 
than as expert knowledge and accordingly discount those findings. This is 
problematic because science is foundational to rational agency 
decisionmaking as well as democratic governance.361 A democratic society 
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can identify and confront the problems it faces only if voters are informed 
about those problems.362 
All else being equal, some partisan activity by the scientific 
community might not be too worrisome. But not all else is equal. 
Postmodernist critiques have weakened science’s claim to represent objective 
reality.363 For years, powerful industries—most notably, tobacco and fossil 
fuel companies—have attacked and sought to defund scientists whose 
findings threaten their economic interests.364 At the same time, technological 
developments—think Google, Wikipedia, and Facebook—have increased the 
availability but not necessarily the quality of information, undermining 
traditional sources of authority.365 Furthermore, the Internet and splintering 
of media allow individuals to indulge in confirmation bias and choose their 
preferred versions of reality.366 Together, these attacks and trends have 
diminished respect for scientific and other kinds of expertise.367 Partisan 
activity by scientists might provoke further attacks by a president bent on 
fueling populist rage at elites and experts.368 While overall public confidence 
in scientists to act in the public interest has remained relatively high 
compared to other groups,369 trust in scientists is generally soft rather than 
strong, and trust in scientists with respect to certain issues—including climate 
change—is comparatively low.370 
Trump’s war on regulatory science could cause long-term damage to 
research science in other ways as well. Budding scientists might choose other 
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fields of study or avoid much-needed research on disfavored topics; indeed, 
anecdotal evidence indicates that some scientists are avoiding any mention 
of climate change in grant proposals.371  Further effects, such as a decline in 
overall scientific productivity, are possible though perhaps not immediately 
measurable.  Canada’s experience under Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
offers a warning: following years of censorship of government scientists and 
cuts to scientific research, as well as elimination of the position of national 
science adviser, “Canada’s share of global scientific publications slipped, as 
did the number of patents attributed to inventors in Canada and the number 
of people enrolled in science Ph.D.s.”372  If it is prolonged, the war on 
regulatory science in the United States could have similar effects. 
Conclusion 
 Collectively, the Trump Administration’s actions constitute a war on 
regulatory science.  The war is being waged on multiple fronts, and itself is a 
subset of broader efforts to deconstruct the regulatory state. The war on 
regulatory science also complements other attacks and trends that have 
undermined traditional sources of authority. Left unchecked, the war on 
regulatory science threatens vital health and environmental protections and 
even our democracy. 
 How can the war on regulatory science be countered? Courts offer 
one partial avenue for responding, but their reach is limited. Much agency 
activity lies beyond effective judicial review. Internal administrative law and 
agency norms are also important, but their enforcement cannot be entrusted 
to the executive branch alone. Ultimately, broad-based and multi-pronged 
resistance—at the ballot box, through public protests and political pressure, 
and via nonfederal and private support for scientific inquiry and data 
availability—may be necessary to ensure the vitality of science-based 
decisionmaking in the public interest. 
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